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Abstract
This dissertation is composed of three essays in applied microeconomics, each studying
the behavioral response to incentives and regulations. The first chapter tests whether
weakening criminal sanctions based on the use of violence effectively reduces the
severity of a criminal act.

In 2013, the United States Department of Justice

reduced sentence years for drug criminals who do not possess weapons. Regression
Discontinuity Design estimates of the probability of weapon possession of drug
offenders show an 11-percentage point reduction in Florida’s border counties. The
second chapter estimates the impact of the refugee influx in Germany on recorded
crimes by the immigration status of accused parties. This study uses the presence of
vacant military facilities, which are converted to emergency shelters for refugees, as
an instrument for refugee populations. I find one additional recorded refugee crime
for every ten incoming refugees. However, the aggregate crime rate in Germany
in these years remained unchanged because refugees’ arrival significantly reduced
crime committed by natives. The third chapter estimates the effect of child support
payments on female-headed households. For identification, this study exploits the
state-to-state variation in implementing the State Tax Refund Intercept (STRI)
program, which collects child support arrearages by garnishing the absent parents’
state income tax refund. The difference-in-difference estimate shows that the STRI
significantly increased the likelihood of a household receiving child support. As a
result, single mothers are less likely to receive welfare; more likely to get out of
poverty; increase their labor supply.

v

Table of Contents
1 Behavioral Responses to Changes in Enforcement Priorities

1

1.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

1.2

The Holder Memo Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

1.2.1

What does exactly Holder Memo say? . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

1.2.2

Are criminals aware of the Holder Memo? . . . . . . . . . . .

8

1.2.3

Federal Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

1.3

Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

1.4

Empirical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

1.4.1

Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

Main Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

18

1.5.1

Holder Memo Starts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21

1.5.2

Holder Memo End . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

25

Robustness Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

1.6.1

Sample Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

1.6.2

Seasonality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

36

1.6.3

Difference-in-Discontinuity

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

39

1.6.4

Sample Period Restriction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

42

1.6.5

Possibility of a long-run effect of the Holder Memo . . . . . .

43

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

45

1.5

1.6

1.7

2 Refugees and Crime in Germany

46

vi

2.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

46

2.2

Asylum Procedure: Refugee Resettlement Policy . . . . . . . . . . . .

50

2.3

Identification Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

51

2.4

Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

61

2.5

Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

64

2.6

Refugees and reported crimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

68

2.7

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

72

3 The Effect of Child Support on Female-headed Household: Selfsufficiency and Labor Supply

74

3.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

74

3.2

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

79

3.3

Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

83

3.4

Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

85

3.4.1

Determine pre and post-intervention group . . . . . . . . . . .

87

3.4.2

Determine treatment and control group . . . . . . . . . . . . .

87

3.4.3

Parallel trend assumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

88

3.4.4

Difference-in-difference design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

93

Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

95

3.5.1

Child support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

97

3.5.2

Self-sufficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

97

3.5.3

Labor market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

99

3.5.4

Child Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

3.5

3.6

Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

3.7

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

A

Appendix A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

B

Appendix B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

C

Appendix C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

Vita

134
vii

List of Tables
1.1

State and federal criminal cases in border and non-Border Counties .

11

1.2

Summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15

1.3

Use of weapon of drug offense in border county with control variables

20

1.4

RD: main result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

22

1.5

RDD: Holder ends main result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

28

1.6

Federal cases: the number of drug offenders without weapon (± 210
days from August,2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.7

32

Sample selection: upper and lower bound of weapon use in drug offense
border county . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35

1.8

Seasonality: weapon use in drug offense in border county . . . . . . .

37

1.9

Diff-in-disc estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

41

1.10 Data restriction: weapon use in drug offense border county . . . . . .

44

1.11 DDRD: possibility of a long-run effect of the Holder Memo . . . . . .

44

2.1

Summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

63

2.2

2SLS: refugee arrival and crime rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

67

2.3

2SLS: heterogeneity in recorded refugee crimes per capita . . . . . . .

67

2.4

2SLS: the effect of refugee on reported crime rate . . . . . . . . . . .

69

2.5

2SLS: sub-categories of crime committed by natives and foreigners . .

71

3.1

Summary statistics (CPS-CSS data) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

86

3.2

Sensitivity test: mother received any child support payment last year

96

viii

3.3

DiD: the effect of state tax refund intercept (STRI) on CS payments .

98

3.4

DiD: the effect of CS payment on public support reliance . . . . . . .

98

3.5

DiD: the effect of CS payment on labor supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

3.6

DiD: the effect of CS payment on child investment . . . . . . . . . . . 103

A.1 RD: main result with alternative polynomial degrees

. . . . . . . . . 116

A.2 RD: main result with alternative kernels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
B.1 Event study: refugee and crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
B.2 Event study: control variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
B.3 2SLS: refugee arrival and their crime rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
B.4 Alternative 2SLS result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
B.5 2SLS: Refugees and crime in different year window . . . . . . . . . . 124
B.6 2SLS: net change in refugee crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
B.7 2SLS: the effect of refugee arrival on the crime rate in neighboring
districts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
B.8 2SLS: the effect of refugee arrival on the crime rate in neighboring
districts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
C.1 Legislation year of child support enforcement part 1 . . . . . . . . . . 128
C.2 Legislation year of child support enforcement part 2 . . . . . . . . . . 129
C.3 Legislation year of child support enforcement part 3 . . . . . . . . . . 130
C.4 DiD: main results without states without income tax. . . . . . . . . . 131
C.5 DiD: the effect of STRI on labor supply (mother as co-breadwinner or
sole breadwinner in her household) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
C.6 DiD: the effect of STRI on the likelihood mother living with an adult
with a job. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

ix

List of Figures
1.1

The number of controlled substances dispensed per population in FL
2011-2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

1.2

Smoothness test of the observable characteristics of offenders . . . . .

17

1.3

Smoothness test of the observable characteristics of offenders 2 . . . .

19

1.4

Percentage of weapon used in drug related Crime . . . . . . . . . . .

20

1.5

RDD any drug offense: border counties ±150 Days . . . . . . . . . .

23

1.6

RDD any drug offense: border counties ±100 Days . . . . . . . . . .

24

1.7

RDD any drug offense: non-border counties . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

26

1.8

RDD any drug offense: all counties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27

1.9

Holder end, RDD any drug offense: border counties . . . . . . . . . .

29

1.10 Holder end, RDD any drug offense: all Counties . . . . . . . . . . . .

30

1.11 Federal cases: the number of drug offenders without weapon in FL

.

32

1.12 RDD drug offense: border counties cut off date 8/12/2011 . . . . . .

38

2.1

Unconditional trend of asylum seekers (refugees) based on MFs . . .

53

2.2

OLS by year: refugee and crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

56

2.3

OLS by year: control variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

58

2.4

OLS by year: crime variables

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

60

3.1

Number of states implementing tax refund intercept . . . . . . . . . .

81

3.2

STRI year by states . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

82

3.3

Mother received any child support last year . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

90

x

3.4

Amount of child support received in 1999 dollars . . . . . . . . . . . .

92

3.5

Demographics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

94

A.1 Smoothness test of the hispanic offenders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
B.1 Permits for the construction of new residential buildings . . . . . . . 127
C.1 Mother received any child support last year (baseline year k = −1) . 132
C.2 Robustness check: mother received any child support last year . . . . 133

xi

Chapter 1
Behavioral Responses to Changes
in Enforcement Priorities
1.1

Introduction

Economic studies of crime have been testing and developing a utility-maximizing
criminal model where the benefits and costs of crime determine one’s likelihood of
committing a particular crime. Despite its popularity, the empirical studies find
different results that differ from this theoretical prediction. For instance, a harsher
sanction should deter future crimes of utility-maximizing criminals by increasing the
expected cost of the crime. However, the deterrence literature finds no conclusive
empirical evidence on the deterrence effect of criminal sanctions.1 [70] and [49] point
out that a series of enhanced criminal punishments during the 1990s, such as threestrikes laws in California or zero-tolerance policing in New York City, did not always
reduce crimes. [20] writes that “no consistent body of literature has developed over
the last twenty-five to thirty years indicating that harsh sanctions deter crimes.”
1

There had been a heated debate on the deterrence effect of capital punishment since the mid1990s (Dezhbakhsh et al. 17, Donohue and Wolfers 19, and Fagan 22). [70] argues that there is no
credible evidence of the deterrence effect of capital punishment. [42] even finds that the existence
of the death penalty increases homicide.

1

These inconclusive results prevail in studies that use a binary measure of criminal
behavior — whether or not a person commits a crime (the “single-act” framework).
For example, economists have been testing whether a harsher sanction deters one from
committing a crime. However, this single act framework may be a limited measure
because a criminal act is a set of continuous actions along the spectrum of harmfulness,
instead of a binary act. A drug trafficker may choose how many drugs to smuggle.
An offender may progress from possession of a weapon, to an act of intimidation, to
the actual use of violence. This continuous measure of criminal behavior may induce
a different conclusion in finding the optimal law enforcement.
This study uses an idea of criminal behavior where (1) offenders can choose the
degree of illegal activity and (2) the social cost of a crime depends on the degree of
crime they choose to engage in. [68] and [55] explain the idea of marginal deterrence
in terms of the notion that a potential criminal is choosing from a range of mutually
exclusive actions along a spectrum of increasing severity.2 Optimal enforcement, then,
requires calibrating the gradient of sanctions along with the range of actions.
In this paper, I show that law enforcement policy influences the degree to which
one will engage in harmful activity. In 2013, Attorney General Eric Holder and
President Barack Obama argued that the federal cost of imprisoning low-level drug
offenders had increased beyond their control. The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
reported that the number of inmates in federal prison increased from 125,560 to
176,849 between 2000 and 2013. The BOP increased the budget by $6.8 billion in
2014, a 10% increase compared to 2010.3 To promote the efficiency of the federal
justice system, the Justice Department of the United States implemented the socalled Smart on Crime Initiative, also known as the Holder Memo. The Holder
Memo instructed prosecutors to decline to charge the mandatory minimum sentence
2

[66] explains the notion of marginal deterrence quoting [8]: “to induce a man to choose
always the least mischievous of two offenses; therefore where two offenses come in competition,
the punishment for the greater offense must be sufficient to induce a man to prefer the less.”
3
See [78]

2

for drug criminals who (1) do not use a credible threat of violence, (2) do not possess
a weapon, and (3) do not belong to a criminal organization.
The Holder Memo provides a unique quasi-experiment for evaluating a criminal’s
behavior in the context of marginal deterrence theory. To illustrate, drug offenders
choose whether to carry a weapon at the crime scene, and the policy imposes different
levels of sanctions depending on their choice to carry a weapon or not. The policy
satisfies the requirement of testing marginal deterrence theory. Carrying a weapon or
not is adjacent to the range of possible criminal acts; the possession of a weapon is the
more harmful action. The policy imposes an exogenous shock on the punishment for
non-weapon possession, and it no longer charges the mandatory minimum sentence
on unarmed drug offenders.
For the empirical strategy, this study applies Regression Discontinuity Design
(RDD) using the date of crime as the running variable.

The main identifying

assumption of RDD requires that unobservable determinants of weapon possession
are continuous around the cut-off date. I argue that the timing of the Holder Memo
is an exogenous shock for criminals. In addition, I address possible time-varying
endogeneities through multiple robustness tests.
In the short-run, drug offenders significantly reduce their weapon possession after
the implementation of the Holder Memo. The short-run decline in weapon possession
(an 11 percentage point reduction) was most significant in counties on the northern
edge of Florida, near the state border line (border counties).4 This finding indicates
that a harsher sanction on more harmful activity changes a criminal’s degree of
harmful activity. However, decisions not to carry guns appear to be transitory. In
the longer run, weapon carrying rates are higher post-Holder Memo than pre-Holder
Memo. The annual average weapon possession rate was 8.7% before the policy, but
it increases to 10% after the Holder Memo. The RDD estimate also shows that the
gradient of weapon possession rate is upward slopping. Nonetheless, it is possible
4

The counties on the border of Florida and other states are Baker, Columbia, Escambia, Gadsden,
Hamilton, Holmes, Jackson, Jefferson, Leon, Madison, Nassau, Okaloosa, Santa Rosa, and Walton
County.

3

that the Holder Memo may slow down the increasing trend of weapon possession.
The weapon possession rate in border counties where the effect of the Holder Memo
is most significant is relatively lower than in the other part of Florida. I find that the
border counties have an 8% lower weapon possession rate up to 600 days after the
Holder Memo.
The result also shows that criminals’ behavior toward the Holder Memo is
asymmetric; there is no behavioral change when the Holder Memo is repealed (in
other words, there is no behavioral change when the expected sanction increases).
On May 10, 2017, a new Attorney General, Jeff Sessions, reversed all guidelines of
the 2013 Holder Memo and returned to the mandatory minimum sentence for drug
offenders, which increases the expected cost of a crime. The visual evidence of RDD
shows a modest change in the gradient of the linear projections in the border counties.
However, such a change is not statistically significant.
This paper also addresses the possibility of federal law enforcement handing over
low-profile drug cases to state law enforcement. The purpose of the Holder Memo is to
reduce the cost of holding low-profile drug offenders in federal prisons. The inability
to enforce the mandatory minimum sentence to non-violent drug offenders may
disincentivize federal investigations and eliminate many low-profile drug offenders in
federal offender data. This study uses state inmate data to avoid the sample selection
issue while exploiting the fact that drug criminals are subject to investigation by
federal and state law enforcement. However, federal investigators may still hand over
unarmed criminals to state investigators after the Holder Memo, which leads state
data to collect more unarmed offenders. I use [18]’s method to estimate the lower and
upper bounds of the estimated coefficients, assuming that federal law enforcement
transfers unarmed drug offenders to the state. Even with the assumption of this
extreme sample selection issue, the results of this study remain robust.
In addition, I address the possibility that a seasonal trend or time-varying
unobservables drive the decline in weapon possession. The placebo test finds no
decline in weapon possession of drug offenders between 2000 and 2012. In this test,
4

I make hypothetical Holder Memo dates and set the same day and month of the
Holder Memo but with different years. For example, a hypothetical Holder Memo
date is set at August 12, 2010, instead of August 12, 2013, the actual date of the
implementation. The RD estimation with these hypothetical Holder Memo dates
shows no changes in the probability of weapon possession between 2000 and 2012.
In addition, this study also includes a Discontinuity in Difference design (or diff-indisc) to address spurious variation generated by state and county. By combining
RD and Difference-in-Difference design features, the estimator cancels out potential
time-varying unobservables around the date of the Holder Memo. For example,
criminals may have difficulty obtaining illegal weapons in the border county, or the
police department hires new officers around the time of the Holder Memo. These
spurious variations may have driven the result above. The diff-in-disc cancels out
these variations and isolates the effect of the Holder Memo. The results show that
the Holder Memo significantly reduces the probability of weapon possession by 13
percentage points, similar to the original RD estimate of an 11-percentage point
reduction.
These findings contribute to the marginal deterrence literature designed by [68].
Despite its theoretical extension including [45] and [77], empirical evidence on
marginal deterrence is in demand. One empirical study of marginal deterrence tests
the effect of a criminal sanction on murder in kidnapping. [16] finds that the enhanced
sanction on murder in kidnapping decreases the number of kidnappings resulting in
death in Italy. [16]’s finding explains a sequential behavior of criminals in the context
of marginal deterrence, whereby a kidnapper commits a crime (kidnapping) and then
later decides whether or not to murder the victim. [25] proposes another context of
marginal deterrence: when an offender simultaneously chooses between two different
criminal acts with different levels of harm. This study empirically tests the nonsequential behavior of marginal deterrence: an offender can commit a drug crime
with or without a weapon, leading to different levels of harm.

5

Furthermore, this study tests effectiveness of add-on law, an enhanced sentence
for criminals using firearms. Some studies find that the add-on law affects the binary
measure of criminal behavior. [1] finds the sentence enhancement on the possession of
a weapon deters gun robbery by 5 percent. [52] studies whether mandating minimum
sentences for crimes with guns reduce crime and finds a modest reduction in a few
states. This study tests whether an add-on law is effective at the intensive margin.
The results suggest that an enhanced sentence for criminals using firearms makes
crime less violent.
From a theoretical perspective, the short-run effect of the Holder Memo implies
that the marginal cost of carrying guns exceeds the marginal benefits. The marginal
cost of carrying a gun may include an increased time in prison combined with the
probability of being caught ([6]). Also, carrying a gun increases the chance of federal
prosecution, which have a 99% of conviction rate, whereas the conviction rate in
Florida state court is 72% between 2009 and 2013. However, the transitory effect of
the Holder Memo suggests that in the long run, the marginal benefits of carrying guns
exceed the marginal cost. Although there is a lack of empirical studies on the marginal
benefits of carrying guns, the growing literature on gun control and crime suggests
that concealed handguns significantly reduce violent crimes and murder (Lott and
Mustard 50, Olson and Maltz 57, Moody 54, Gius 28, Gius 29). Thus, carrying guns
is possible means of self-defense. In my sample, 9.4% of drug crimes in the border
county involve violence before the Holder Memo, but it increases to 11% (the average
violence two years before and after the Holder Memo). These statistics may not
guarantee that the drug offender’s perceived risk of involving violence also increases
after the Holder Memo. However, the transitory effect of the Holder Memo suggests
that the benefits of self-defense may be larger than the benefits of the decreased time
in prison.

6

1.2

The Holder Memo Background

1.2.1

What does exactly Holder Memo say?

The Holder Memo came into effect on August 12, 2013, to reduce the federal budget
and ensure fair federal law enforcement. The five principles were as follows: (1)
setting priority of prosecutions on the most serious cases; (2) reforming sentencing
guidelines to eliminate unjust disparities and reduce the burden of prison expenses;
(3) providing alternatives to incarceration for low-level, non-violent offenders; (4)
preventing recidivism and re-victimization; and (5) using more resources to prevent
violence and secure the safety of the most vulnerable populations.
Specific instructions in [34] are as follows:
[I]n cases involving the applicability of Title 21 mandatory minimum
sentences based on drug type and quantity, prosecutors should decline to
charge the quantity necessary to trigger a mandatory minimum sentence
if the defendant meets each of the following criteria:
• The defendant’s relevant conduct does not involve the use of violence,
the credible threat of violence, the possession of a weapon, the
trafficking of drugs to or with minors, or the death or serious bodily
injury of any person
• The defendant is not an organizer, leader, manager or supervisor of
others within a criminal organization;
• The defendant does not have significant ties to large-scale drug
trafficking organizations, gangs, or cartels; and
• The defendant does not have a significant criminal history.

A

significant criminal history will normally be evidenced by three
or more criminal history points but may involve fewer or greater
depending on the nature of any prior convictions.
7

Prosecutors should decline to file an information pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
§ 851 unless the defendant is involved in conduct that makes the case
appropriate for severe sanctions. (Similar to Title 21 mandatory minimum
sentences)
I choose the possession of a weapon as the main behavioral variable for criminals.
[39] provides charging and sentencing recommendations for the Holder Memo. G.
Scott Hulsey, Assistant United States Attorney, argues that in applying the Holder
Memo, the criminal’s possession of a weapon or engagement in violence are self-evident
and do not call for extensive discussion as to whether or not the Holder Memo is
applicable. In contrast, “significant ties to large-scale drug trafficking organization”
are less obvious. It is not clear that the introduction of the Holder Memo would make
criminals more likely to leave their criminal organization.

1.2.2

Are criminals aware of the Holder Memo?

The nature of drug crime investigations makes it reasonable to assume that drug
offenders are aware of the Holder Memo. In drug offenses, there are no victims to
report the crime to the police. Thus, the drug investigation relies on undercover
operations. Let us take for example the buy-busy strategy, where undercover agents
or wired informants set up small drug purchases to catch a drug dealer. Operation
“street sweeper” is another strategy, in which undercover agents make a drug purchase
in a bar from a suspected drug dealer. A federal defender describes how these
operations are conducted (Lynch 51):
The undercover officers would sit a the bar, and they’d say to the person
next to them, “do you know where I can score?” And they’d give the
person some money, . . . , get them some crack,. . . . That would form the
basis of the case and maybe there’d be two or three of those hand-to-hand
sales. Sometimes they’d try to get it upover five gram [to get mandatory
minimum]
8

But drug criminals develop defense strategies against such undercover operations.
“Body weight” or ”body carry” refers to the carrying of an amount of drugs below
controlled substance schedules such that one can claim the drugs are for personal use
rather than sale or distribution (Buerger 10). This way, criminals can avoid felony
charges for the distribution and sale of illicit drugs. In the 1970s, drug traffickers
from Nayarit, Mexico, set a rule of “never carry guns and never violent” (Quinones
61). These stories tell us that sentencing guidelines play a central role in forming
both drug criminal and police strategies. I interviewed a former district attorney who
noted that even an offender who is slightly involved in drug dealing is aware of the
expected risk of committing a drug crime.
Empirical studies suggest that criminals are relatively well aware of the risks
associated with committing a crime. [32] shows that offenders are better informed of
the risk of imprisonment. Using survey data of over two thousand inmates in jails and
prisons in California, Michigan, and Texas, [32] finds a close correspondence between
the actual and perceived risk of imprisonment in Michigan and Texas.

1.2.3

Federal Jurisdiction

As a federal enforcement policy, the effectiveness of the Holder Memo relies on
the criminals’ exposure and perceived risk of a federal investigation. Both federal
and state investigators can charge any drug offenders, and, in practice, both law
enforcement agencies cooperate on most drug crime investigations.

The federal

agencies usually decide whether to bring the case to the federal court or hand it
to the local police. Sometimes, though, the local police voluntarily refer their cases
to the federal agencies, since conviction rates in federal courts are higher than in
state courts. Even though local law enforcements initially charge drug offenders,
the federal agency can take over their cases from state courts. Such a cooperative
dynamic between federal and local law enforcements expose drug offenders under
federal charges.
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Federal investigations target serious drug offenses, and over 90% of federal cases
are for drug trafficking. Federal law enforcement, however, can charge low-profile drug
offenders if agencies believe that such crimes potentially involve criminal organizations
or large-scale drug operations. By way of example, in 2012, 30,476 drug offenders were
arrested by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), while the local and
state agencies arrested 1,328,457 drug offenders.
Drug criminals near the state-line border get greater attention from federal law
enforcement, especially in Florida, which was a focal point of the opioid epidemic
starting from 2011.5 Federal investigators have turned their attention from cocaine
to opioids, which are prescribed narcotic pain medications. Opioids accounted for
60% of drug overdose deaths in 2014 (Rudd et al. 63). In 2010, Florida had 90 of
the nation’s top 100 opioid prescribing doctors and the state prescribed 85% of the
nation’s oxycodone, selling over 500 million pills.6 Figure 1.1 shows the number of
prescribed drugs per population in Florida. The left side of the graph shades (in red)
the counties with the highest number of opioids dispensed per capita, the upper 25%
of the quartiles. The right side shades (in blue) the upper 50% of quartiles. A large
volume of pills was prescribed in the northern part of the state, near the state border,
facilitating state-to-state distribution. This geographic concentration of pill mills in
these years drew the attention of federal investigators.
Drug criminals near the state border have had a higher chance of being persecuted
by federal agencies if they criminals carry weapons. Table 1.1 shows the portion of
federal drug crime cases per the state cases. The first column shows the number
of federal drug crime cases with a weapon charge divided by the number of state
drug crime cases with a weapon charge in the border counties. The average ratio
between 2010 and 2013 is 0.288 and the ratio in 2013 when the Holder Memo was
implemented is 0.364.7 Comparing the second column which shows the federal and
5

Handberg, R. B. (2020). The Opioid epidemic In Florida: 2000 to 2017, Florida Bar Journal,
Vol. 94, No. 3.
6
For further references see link
7
It may not be ideal to interpret the ratio as the percentage of the federal investigation out of all
drug crime cases since the federal and state offense data is not comparable. The federal cases come
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Figure 1.1: The number of controlled substances dispensed per population in FL
2011-2012
Note: This hitmap shows the number of controlled susbstances dispensed per population between
2011 and 2012 in Florida. The map is made by the statistics from the Florida Department of
Health, 2012-2013 Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Annual Report.

Table 1.1: State and federal criminal cases in border and non-Border Counties
Drug crime with weapon
Border
Non-border

Drug crime without weapon
Border
Non-border

Federal cases 2010-13
State cases 2010-13

0.288

0.253

0.137

0.173

Federal cases 2013
State cases 2013

0.364

0.200

0.133

0.157

Note: this table shows the federal drug crime cases divided the state drug crime cases based on
whether the offenders carry weapons or not. Federal cases 2010-13 come from the Administrative
Office of the United States District Courts’ (AOUSC), which contains defendants’ records in
criminal cases in the United States District Court. States cases 2010-13 include information on
inmates in Florida state prisons.
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state drug crime case ratio in non-border counties, drug criminals with weapons have
14% more likely to be persecuted by the federal agent during 2010 and 2013, and 82%
more in the Holder Memo implementation year. The third and fourth column of the
table shows the same ratio for drug offenses without weapon charges. In these cases,
the probability of federal prosecution is higher in non-border counties.
Table 1.1 suggests federal agents are more likely to pursue drug crimes involving
guns near the state border line. Criminals may want to avoid the federal charges since
the federal court has a higher conviction rate and a longer sentence year. Although
the criminal’s perceived risk of a federal investigation is not observable, this higher
actual risk of federal charges may alert the drug offenders in the border counties not
to carry weapons in the border counties.

1.3

Data

The Florida Department of Correction (FL DOC 2017) maintains OBIS. This data
is publicly available and provides state prison inmate information, including types
of offense, date of offense, gender, race, year sentenced, and prison release date for
every inmate in a Florida state prison or under state supervision since October 1997.
The total number of observations from 1995 to 2020 is 1,178,138, and observations in
2013, the year of the Holder Memo implementation, were 45,520. The data includes
information on multiple charges for offenders; thus, I can identify if a drug offender
carried a weapon or not at the scene of the crime.8

Drug crimes include drug

possession, drug sales, manufacturing, distribution (SMD), and drug trafficking. This
from the Administrative Office of the United States District Courts’ (AOUSC), which has defendants’
records in the United States District Court. States cases contain information on inmates in Florida
state prisons. The best interpretation is federal drug crime cases which are normalized by the state
drug crime cases.
8
Criminals can have weapons-related charges for various reasons such as possession of a weapon,
manufacturing, or selling. According to the 2013 records of OBIS data, 97% of weapons charges are
possession related. “Possession of a Firearm, Ammunition or a Concealed Weapon by a Convicted
Felon” is the highest at 80%, followed by “Carrying Concealed Firearm” at 17%
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data contains sensitive information such as inmates’ names and unique identifiers for
cases and inmates.
The advantage of using OBIS is that it is less affected by potential selection
bias caused by the Holder Memo. The data only includes offenders either sentenced
to state prison or under state supervision.

An analysis using federal criminal

records alone would cause sample selection bias because the Holder Memo limits the
investigation of non-violent drug crimes to federal investigators. Federal data might
contain fewer unarmed drug offenders, not because of actual changes in criminals’
behavior, but because of fewer investigations into drug offenders who do not carry
weapons after the Holder Memo. Under the U.S. dual justice system, state law
enforcement authorities are not directly subjected to the Holder Memo. However,
state-level data may possess issues related to sample selection due to the cooperative
nature of state and federal investigators. Most drug crimes are subject to both
federal and state investigations, and federal law enforcement usually decides whether
a crime is subject to federal investigation. The Holder Memo prevented imposing the
mandatory minimum sentence for violent drug offenders and additional penalties to
ex-felons, potentially reducing incentives for federal agents to investigate less serious
drug crimes. Therefore, more low-profile criminals may be investigated by state agents
because of the Holder Memo. I will discuss the sample selection issue further in
Section 1.6.
I restricted the sample duration to two years before and after the introduction
of the Holder Memo. I chose to do so because of the characteristics of the running
variable. In Regression Discontinuity in Time (RDiT), where time is used as the
running variable, increasing the time window causes problems. [31] mentions that
increasing the duration of a sample in RDiT is likely to cause bias, especially in the
presence of an auto-regressive process or disparity in short-run and long-run effects. I
also see that the MSE-optimal bandwidth is estimated to be over 500 days long when
the sample period is not restricted whereas it is only 267 days for the restricted case.
A period of more than 500 days may cause bias in coefficients, as indicated by [31].
13

The same sample restriction applies to when the Holder Memo was rescinded on May
10th, 2017. I restricted the duration of the sample year to two years before and two
years after. The unrestricted results are shown in Section 1.6.4.
Table 1.2 shows summary statistics in the restricted sample period. The variables
include a weapon possession indicator, race, age, gender, and sentenced year with the
mean and variance of these variables in all counties and in border counties. Panel
A shows the summary statistics before and after the Holder Memo was initiated.
Some variables differ before and after the Holder Memo. The probability of weapon
possession generally increases after the Holder Memo, indicating the possibility that
the Holder Memo may not deter criminals from carrying a weapon.

After the

Holder Memo, the proportion of black offenders decreased, and for border counties, it
decreased from 0.489 to 0.455. In addition, the size of the sample in the border
counties increased from 1611 to 1720. This suggests the possibility that federal
investigators have decided not to pursue drug crimes, and state investigators took
these cases instead after the Holder Memo. Similarly, in Panel B, the size of the sample
in the border counties increased after the Holder Memo was rescinded. Moreover, the
number of years sentenced in border counties decreased by 0.4 years (or 4.8 months)
after the Holder Memo. This may indicate state law enforcement authorities imposed
weaker penalties on drug offenders, as per the Holder Memo guidelines. However,
sentence years have not rebounded after the Holder Memo repeal (Panel B). Although
differences in variables before and after the Holder Memo may be simply due to trends,
I will address the risk of selection bias.

1.4
1.4.1

Empirical Analysis
Methodology

For the empirical method, I use a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) that utilizes
the characteristics of data and the Holder Memo. The treatment groups are drug
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Table 1.2: Summary statistics
All County
Before
After
Panel A. Holder Memo Starts (8/29/2013)

Border County
Before
After

Weapons Possession

0.087
(0.283)

0.110
(0.312)

0.100
(0.301)

0.128
(0.335)

Black

0.503
(0.500)

0.478
(0.500)

0.489
(0.500)

0.455
(0.498)

Hispanic

0.035
(0.185)

0.037
(0.188)

0.005
(0.070)

0.006
(0.076)

Age

33.774
(10.308)

34.457
(10.408)

32.716
(9.915)

33.247
(9.733)

Male

0.841
(0.366)

0.845
(0.362)

0.805
(0.396)

0.828
(0.378)

Total Year Sentenced

3.328
(8.968)

3.377
(9.746)

3.410
(12.102)

3.090
(9.649)

Observations

16662

15514

1611

1720

Panel B. Holder Memo Ends (5/10/2017)
Weapons Possession

0.130
(0.336)

0.141
(0.348)

0.149
(0.356)

0.147
(0.354)

Black

0.443
(0.497)

0.417
(0.493)

0.434
(0.496)

0.377
(0.485)

Hispanic

0.040
(0.197)

0.044
(0.205)

0.007
(0.085)

0.009
(0.095)

Age

34.709
(10.303)

36.061
(10.325)

33.881
(9.356)

35.976
(10.023)

Male

0.837
(0.369)

0.839
(0.368)

0.816
(0.388)

0.826
(0.379)

Total Year Sentenced

3.271
(8.280)

2.934
(6.696)

2.848
(3.000)

2.706
(2.884)

Observations

15169

11888

1932

1664

Note: In the Panel A, The sample period in ”Before” is from 8/29/2012 to 8/29/2013. The sample
period in ”After” is from 8/29/2013 to 8/29/2014. In the Panel B, The sample period in ”Before”
is from 5/10/2015 to 5/10/2017. The sample period in ”After” is from 5/10/2017 to 5/10/2019.
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offenders who committed a crime after the Holder Memo was implemented on August
12, 2013. The estimating sample only includes drug crimes. I use the date of crime as
a running variable to address the possible effect of the Holder Memo. The estimating
equation is as follows.
Yit = α + βAf terit + g(DaysFromCutoffit ) + g(DaysFromCutoffit ) × Af terit + ϵit
(1.1)
Yit is a dummy variable that equals one if a drug offender i possesses a weapon
at the crime.

Yit equals zero if the drug offender does not possess a weapon.

The sample of this analysis contains only offenders who committed drug-related
crimes.

i represents a criminal, and t is time by day.

The variable Af ter is

an indicator variable that equals one if t is after the date of the Holder Memo.
g(DaysFromCutoff) indicates the difference between the date the offender i committed
the crime and August 12, 2013: RDD’s running variable. The interaction term,
g(DaysFromCutoffit ) × Af terit allows running variables and drug-related violent
crimes to change before and after the cutoff day. Control variables are not included
in this empirical analysis. Heteroskedasticity-robust errors are used to estimate the
variance-covariance matrix.
This study uses the MSE-optimal bandwidth selector proposed by [12] and [13].
I use the first-degree polynomial function in my analysis, but I show the result with
alternative bandwidths and polynomials.
The identifying assumption of the RDD is that unobserved determinants of
weapon possession of drug offenders are continuous at the threshold. Although this
assumption cannot be tested, we can see the continuity of observable variables around
the cut-off day. Figure 1.2 contains estimates of changes in offenders’ gender, race,
age, and sentence years before and after the threshold.9 None of these variables
changes significantly at the Holder Memo date threshold.
9

The RD smoothness test for Hispanic offenders is not included since the number of Hispanic
offenders is small (3% in summer statistics), and most of the scatter plot data points were zero. The
graph is in Figure A.1 in the Appendix.
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Figure 1.2: Smoothness test of the observable characteristics of offenders
Notes: In these figures, the dependent variables are offenders’ gender, race, age, and total years
sentenced. The estimating equation is identical to Equation 1.1 and the MSE-optimal bandwidths
are selected for each dependent variables. Bin sizes are selected by using Mimicking Variable Averagespaced Method (ESMV)
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The last panel of Figure 1.2 show an increase in the total years of sentence after
the Holder Memo, which indicates the state started to deal with more serious drug
crimes. As evidence, the first graph in Figure 1.3 shows that the border counties
had more SMD drug offenses. If the Holder memo discourages federal investigators
from taking unarmed drug offenders, then the state may take these criminals to the
state court and prison. This means that the two graphs may indicate sample selection
instead of actual behavioral responses of criminals to the Holder Memo. I will address
this sample selection issue more deeply in Section 1.6.
Figure 1.3 shows that the state had a similar portion of minor drug offenses around
the implementation of the Holder Memo. Drug crimes involving the use of violence
are also smooth around the cut-off date. The last graph shows that the proportion of
offenders with prior offense records are also continuous around the date of the Holder
Memo.
Table 1.3 shows the main RD results controlling these variables. The RD estimates
are similar with and without the covariates.

1.5

Main Result

Figure 1.4 shows the average percentage of possession of weapons each year, which has
continued to increase since 2006. It is important to note that the criminal’s decision
to carry a weapon is determined by other factors, in addition to the severity of
punishment. Given this upward trend of weapon possession, the question is whether
the Holder Memo can slow down the upward trend of weapons carry in the short
run.10
10

Note that the weapon possession rate has been higher in border counties since 2011. Although
the further analysis is beyond the scope of this study, the trend indicates that drug crimes become
more violent in border counties, which possibly incentivizes federal enforcement to target the area.
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Figure 1.3: Smoothness test of the observable characteristics of offenders 2
Notes: In these figures, the dependent variables are type of drug offense, use of violence, and
prior offense record. The estimating equation is identical to Equation 1.1 and the MSE-optimal
bandwidths are selected for each dependent variables. Bin sizes are selected by using Mimicking
Variable Average-spaced Method (ESMV)
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Table 1.3: Use of weapon of drug offense in border county with control variables
Control Vars
Holder Memo

Observations
Bandwidth
Eff Obs Below Cutoff
Eff Obs Above Cutoff

(1)
None

(2)
Male

(3)
Black

(4)
Age

(5)
Total Years Sentenced

(6)
All

-0.110**
(0.0456)

-0.102**
(0.0453)

-0.100**
(0.0453)

-0.111**
(0.0456)

-0.102**
(0.0453)

-0.0909**
(0.0449)

2,929
197.8
372
431

2,929
197.8
372
431

2,929
197.8
372
431

2,929
197.8
372
431

2,929
197.8
372
431

2,929
197.8
372
431

Notes: The estimating equations are identical to Equation 1.1 except the dependent variable. The
bandwidth is fixed as the same level of MSE-optimal bandwidth with no control varibles, column
1. The second column include offenders’ gender as covariates and next columns include race, age,
and sentenced years as the covariates. The last column includes all four variables as the covariates.
First order polinomial function is used to estimate limites around the threshold.

Figure 1.4: Percentage of weapon used in drug related Crime
Source: Florida Offender Based Information System (OBIS)
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1.5.1

Holder Memo Starts

Table 1.4 shows the RDD estimating result in Florida around the Holder Memo start
date, August 12, 2013. The dependent variable is the possession of a weapon, and the
running variable is the date of crime. The βs is from Equation 1.1. Panel A and Panel
B show the result of only using samples in border counties, and Panel C uses samples
from all counties in Florida. First, we can see that the values of the coefficients vary
depending on the sample range. In border counties, the rate of weapon possession of
drug offenders decreased by 11 percentage points (Panel A and Panel B Column 1)
but there was no significant reduction in weapon possession in all counties (Panel C
Column 1). As mentioned in Section 1.2, drug offenders near the state border have
a higher chance of being under federal investigation, and their exposure to federal
investigation may drive the reduction in weapon possession. This assumption implies
that the Holder Memo should impact serious drug criminals more since federal law
enforcement focus on drug trafficking rather than simple drug possession. In panel A
and B’s second and third columns, the Holder Memo affects selling, manufacturing,
and distributing (SMD) offenders more than drug possession offenders. Criminals
charged with drug possession show a 9.5% reduction in weapon possession, whereas
SMD offenders show a a 13.8% reduction.11
Border counties shows consistent results under two different bandwidths. Panel A
uses 197 days from MSE optimal bandwidth, and Panel B uses narrower bandwidth
of 150 days. I find that the narrower bandwidth shows apparent behavioral changes.
Figure 1.5 and Figure 1.6 present visual evidence for the results of Table 1.4.
The figures show a linear fitted line and scatter plots of weapon possession outcomes
collapsed to 8.8-day bin averages for Figure 1.5 and 7.6-days (below cutoff date) and
8.3-days (above cutoff date) for Figure 1.6.12 Figure 1.5 uses 150 day bandwidth and
Figure 1.6 uses 100 day bandwidth.
11

43% of SMD offenders in the border counties are also charged with drug possession.
For the bin estimation, I use the Stata default method of Mimicking Variable Average-spaced
Method(ESMV).
12
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Table 1.4: RD: main result
All Drug Offense
Panel A. Border Counties
β

-0.110**
(0.0456)
Observations
2,929
Eff Obs Below Cutoff
372
Eff Obs Above Cutoff
431
MSE-optimal Bandwidth (Days)
197.8
Panel B. Border Counties (Constant BW)
β
-0.117**
(0.0502)
Observations
2,929
Eff Obs Below Cutoff
277
Eff Obs Above Cutoff
337
Constant Bandwidth (Days)
150
Panel C. All Counties
β
-0.0117
(0.0140)
Observations
28,697
Eff Obs Below Cutoff
4103
Eff Obs Above Cutoff
4133
MSE-optimal Bandwidth (Days)
207

Possession Drug

SMD

-0.0867*
(0.0473)
2,118
406
473
300.1

-0.120**
(0.0604)
1,374
239
278
271.5

-0.0951
(0.0603)
2,118
200
250
150

-0.138*
(0.0767)
1,374
120
166
150

0.00740
(0.0156)
19,957
3587
3701
259.3

-0.0221
(0.0206)
13,627
1598
1551
174

Notes: The tables reports RDD estimates from Equation 1.1 and heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors are estimated in parentheses. Panel A and Panel B use offenders data in the
border counties. Panel A uses MSE-optimal bandwidth, whereas Panel B uses a constant
bandwidth of 150 days before and after the onset of the Holder Memo, Aug. 12, 2013. Panel C
uses offenders data in all counties. Poloynominal degree one is selected based on graphical evidence
of Table 1.4 (see Figure 1.5 & Figure 1.6). The results with alternative polonomial degree are in
Table A.1. All analysis use poloynominal degree one and triangular kernel (Stata default). The
result is robust with alternative choice of kernels (see Table A.2).
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Figure 1.5: RDD any drug offense: border counties ±150 Days
Notes: This figure is a graphical evidence of the result in Table 1.4 Panel B with bandwidth 150
days. Bin sizes are estimated using Mimicking Variable Average-spaced Method(ESMV). The lines
in the figure above display two linear regressions, estimated separately by the cutoff date, Aug 12,
2013. The scatter plots show the average of the dependent variables for each bin. The running
variable in the figure is the number of days between the offense date and the date of the Holder
Memo starts, Aug 12, 2013. The negative distance indicates that the offenders committed a crime
before the Holder Memo and the offenses committed after the Holder Memo have positive distance
from 0
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Figure 1.6: RDD any drug offense: border counties ±100 Days
Notes: This figure is a graphical evidence of the result in Table 1.4 Panel B with an alternative
bandwidth of 100 days. See Figure 1.5 for a general description of the RD plots.
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Figure 1.6 shows that the weapon possession rate significantly decreased in the
100-day bandwidth. Before the implementation of the Holder Memo, the weapons
possession rate varies widely from 0% up to 40%. After the Holder Memo, however,
the rate of weapon possession is mostly 10% or lower. Comparing the effect of the
Holder Memo between 150 days and 100 days, the effect of the policy is more evident
in the short run; the weapon possession rate drops sharply within 100 days, but it
gradually increases after that.
However, the Holder Memo does not affect non-border counties. Figure 1.7 shows
the weapon possession rate continues around the cut-off date for drug offenders in
non-border counties. Figure 1.8 expands the sample to all counties in Florida. The
weapon possession rates sightly decrease after the Holder Memo, but not significantly.
In summary, the Holder Memo has reduced the probability of weapon possession
of drug offenders, but its effect was short-lived. Moreover, the policy only affected
criminals near the state border.

1.5.2

Holder Memo End

On May 10, 2017, Attorney General Jeff Sessions reversed the Holder Memo and
reimposed the mandatory minimum sentence on low-profile drug offenders. In his
memo [65], he wrote, “It is of the utmost importance to enforce the law fairly
and consistently.” The memo denotes, “Any inconsistent previous policy of the
Department of Justice relating to these matters is rescinded, effective today.”
Table 1.5 shows the RDD result when the Holder Memo was rescinded; it shows no
significant changes in the weapon possession rate. Figure 1.9 and Figure 1.10 present
the visual evidence of Table 1.5. The visual evidence also shows no change of weapon
possession after the rescission. At best for the border counties, the downward trend
of weapon possession stops after the rescission.
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Figure 1.7: RDD any drug offense: non-border counties
Notes: See Figure 1.5 for a general description of the RD plots.
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Figure 1.8: RDD any drug offense: all counties
Notes: This figure is a graphical evidence of the result in Table 1.4 Panel C. See Figure 1.5 for a
general description of the RD plots.
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Table 1.5: RDD: Holder ends main result
Any Drug Offense
Panel A. Border Counties
β

0.0154
(0.0451)
Observations
2,921
Eff Obs Below Cutoff
584
Eff Obs Above Cutoff
531
MSE-optimal Bandwidth (Days)
246.1
Panel B. Border Counties (Constant BW)
β
0.0440
(0.0592)
Observations
2,921
Eff Obs Below Cutoff
373
Eff Obs Above Cutoff
335
Constant Bandwidth (Days)
150
Panel C. All Counties
β
0.0120
(0.0165)
Observations
23,584
Eff Obs Below Cutoff
4042
Eff Obs Above Cutoff
3849
MSE-optimal Bandwidth (Days)
222

Possession Drug

SMD

-0.00749
(0.0474)
2,286
490
425
258.3

0.00242
(0.0984)
888
174
159
252.5

-0.00189
(0.0632)
2,286
302
261
150

0.0461
(0.142)
888
113
94
150

0.0132
(0.0185)
17,953
3164
2983
223.8

0.0140
(0.0265)
9,053
1547
1390
215.1

Notes: The tables reports RDD estimates from Equation 1.1 and heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors are estimated in parentheses. Panel A and Panel B use offenders data in the
border counties. Panel A uses MSE-optimal bandwidth, whereas Panel B uses a constant
bandwidth of 150 days before and after the rescission of the Holder Memo, May. 10, 2017. Panel C
uses offenders data in all counties. See Table 1.4 notes for a general description of the RDD
estimating options including the choice of polynomial and kernel.
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Figure 1.9: Holder end, RDD any drug offense: border counties
Notes: This figure is a graphical evidence of the result in Table 1.5 Panel A. See Figure 1.5 for a
general description of the RD plots.
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Figure 1.10: Holder end, RDD any drug offense: all Counties
Notes: This figure is a graphical evidence of the result in Table 1.5 Panel C. See Figure 1.5 for a
general description of the RD plots.

30

1.6
1.6.1

Robustness Check
Sample Selection

RDD requires comparability of observations above and below the RDD threshold.
However, the RDD results show that Florida state law enforcement had more drug
cases after the Holder Memo. Federal law enforcement may decide not to take lowprofiling drug cases, and these cases are transferred to the state agencies. Although
using Florida’s state inmates’ data, this study needs to address this potential sample
selection issue.
Figure 1.11 shows the number of drug offenders in federal courts aggregated by
6 months. These drug offenders did not carry a weapon at the crime scene. The
horizontal axis is the date of filing the case in the federal court instead of the date of
crime, since the crime date is not observable in the data. The vertical dash line (red)
indicates the potential date of the Holder Memo, an eight-month bandwidth.13 The
graph shows that the federal drug cases in border and non-border counties dropped
after the date of the Holder Memo. State law enforcement could possibly takes these
cases from the federal agencies.
How many are federal cases possibly transferred to the state? Table 1.6 shows the
aggregated federal cases by 210 days (7 months) of drug offenses without weapons
charges. The first column, “Before,” indicates the aggregated number of cases filed 7
months before the date of the Holder Memo (e.g., from January 2013 to July 2013).
The “After” column shows the aggregates cases filed 7 months after the Holder Memo.
In border counties, 45 federal drug cases are potentially transferred to the state in
210 days. If the RDD bandwidth is ±210 days around the date of the Holder Memo,
the degree of a potential sample selection is 45 observations. I estimate the upper
and lower bound of RDD estimator under these hypothetical sample selection issues.
13

Another federal data set, the Executive Office for United States Attorneys (EOUSA) Central
System Data, shows that 90% of federal crimes are filed within 8 months of the date of crime.
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Figure 1.11: Federal cases: the number of drug offenders without weapon in FL
Source: Administrative Office of the United States District Courts’ (AOUSC)

Table 1.6: Federal cases: the number of drug offenders without weapon (± 210 days
from August,2013)
Border
Before After
Drug crime w/o weapon
64
19
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Non-border
Before After
579
493

I use the sample selection model in RDD proposed by [18] to estimate the upper
and lower bound of the RDD coefficient. The advantage of the [18] model is that
as with [47], identification does not require exclusion restrictions nor any underlining
selection mechanism.
To intuitively explain how the model of [18] works, I classify the number of samples
into four groups, as suggested by [23]. For St where S is a binary sample selection
indicator that equals to 1 if the true observation Y ∗ is observable, Y = Y ∗ and S = 0
if Y is missing and t is a binary treatment indicator. So, t = 1 when an individual
commits a drug crime after the Holder Memo and 0 otherwise. Based on St , I can
classify the following: new participants (S0 = 0, S1 = 1), quitters (S0 = 1, S1 = 0),
never participants (S0 = S1 = 0), and always participants (S0 = S1 = 1). [18]
estimates sharp bounds based on always participants. First, it estimates the fraction
of always participants among always participants and new participants, q ≡ P r(S0 =
0, S1 = 1|S1 = 1, C, R = r0 ) using fuzzy RDD. For Yt∗ where Y, t = 0, 1, the low
bounds are estimated using samples with Y1∗ less than 1 − q quantile values of Y1∗ ≤
Q1 (1 − q)Y1∗ and upper bound are with Y1∗ that is greater than the q quantile values
of Y1∗ ≥ Q1 (q)Y1∗ . Mathematically,
βlower =

1
E[1(Y1∗ ≤ Q1 (1 − q)Y1∗ )|S1 = 1, R = r0 , C]
1−q

− E[Y0∗ |S0 = 1, R = r0 , C], and
βupper

1
=
E[1(Y1∗ ≥ Q1 (q)Y1∗ )|S1 = 1, R = r0 , C]
1−q

(1.2)

− E[Y0∗ |S0 = 1, R = r0 , C]
A specific formula derivation process and estimation method are in [18]. This
estimation requires monotonicity assumption, which is,

Assumption (Monotonic Selection):P r(S0 ≤ S1 ) = 1
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The monotonic assumption states that treatment can only cause sample selection
in one direction; in the case of the Holder Memo, everyone is more likely to participate
under treatment.

This assumption reflects that the Holder Memo may spur a

transition of non-violent drug crime cases from federal to state investigators.
In the OBIS data set, it is unidentifiable whether federal or state law enforcement
initially charged the offender or which cases were transferred. However, this paper
assumes an extreme case of a sample selection issue: federal investigators hand over
only unarmed drug criminal cases to state investigators. I randomly select 10 to 30%
of unarmed drug criminals following the implementation of the Holder Memo. Then, I
create an indicator variable marking these selected individuals as the new participants
(observation with sample selection). Then, I use [18]’s strategy to estimate the upper
and lower bound of the always participants.
Table 1.7 shows the upper and lower bounds of β (Table 1.4 Panel A column
1) under the sample selection. Without this hypothetical sample selection, I found
earlier that the possession of a weapon for drug criminals in the border counties
is reduced by 11 percentage points (-.11). Regardless of the percentage of sample
selection, the upper and lower bounds contain -.11 within their intervals. Assuming
10% to 30% of the sample selection, the number of observations with sample selection
is 38.6 in 10% of the sample selection, 77.2 in 20%, and 115.5 in 30%. Note that the
difference of effective observation before and after the Holder Memo is 59 in the main
analysis. In addition, the federal court data shows that, on average, 37.8 cases are
possibly transferred to the state.
The upper bounds where only use Y with Y1∗ ≥ Q1 (q) have a constant negative
coefficient in all hypothetical sample selection degrees. Given that there are 59
additional samples after the Holder Memo, it is reasonable to assume that 10% and
20%, or 38 or 77 samples, are cases handed over from the federal government. The
estimated coefficient value is -.109 and -0.099 are very similar to -0.11 when there is no
sample selection. The lower bound is constant at -.168. The reason is that the lower
bounds select Y1 only with Y1∗ ≤ Q(1 − q) to estimate E[Y1∗ |S1 = 1, R = r0 ] where
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Table 1.7: Sample selection: upper and lower bound of weapon use in drug offense
border county
% of New Participants
Lower Bound
Upper Bound
Number of Obs with Sample Selection
Observations

10%

20%

30%

-0.168***
(0.0482)
-0.109*
(0.0611)
38.6
3,326

-0.168***
(0.0447)
-0.0999
(0.0646)
77.2
3,326

-0.168***
(0.0444)
-0.0611
(0.0883)
115.8
3,326

Notes: The table reports the upper and lower bounds of coefficient of β in Equation 1.1 using the
method introduced in [18]. The RDD estimating options is identical to Table 1.4 (see the notes).
Standard errors are estimated by bootstrapping with 500 replication. The numbder of observation
with sample selection indicates the number of samples that is randomly selected and assigned as
the new participants. The first column 10% assumes the 10% of all unarmed drug offenders after
the Holder Memo are the new participants. For the second and third column assumes that the
proportion of new participants are 20% and 30%.
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q is proportion of new participants. For q = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, E[1(Y1∗ |S1 = 1, R = r0 , C]
is zero, meaning offenders in the lowest 70 to 90 percent of quantile are not carrying
weapons after the Holder Memo.

1.6.2

Seasonality

In this chapter, I test whether a seasonality drives the decline of the weapon possession
rate in the border counties. Another way to interpret the result in Section 1.4 is
that August is the month that usually drug offenders decide not to carry a weapon.
Therefore, I changed the year of cutoff dates. Instead of using August 12, 2013, as the
cutoff date, I use August 12, 2000, to August 12, 2012. Suppose there is a significant
reduction in weapon possession with these hypothetical Holder Memo dates. In that
case, the main RDD result earlier catches the seasonal trend of possession of weapons,
not the effect of the Holder Memo on criminal behavior.
Table 1.8 estimates the change in the probability of weapon possession for drug
offenders in the border county during the year the Holder Memo was deliberately
changed. Each column represents the artificially assigned Holder Memo year. For
example, the year 2000 (column 1) assumes that the Holder Memo was implemented
on August 12, 2000. The estimating equation is identical to Equation 1.1, and the
bandwidth is also the same as Panel A in Table 1.4.
This placebo test reveals that the average coefficient from the year 2000 to 2012 is 0.00263, which shows no evidence that the result of Section 1.4 is driven by seasonality,
except for the year 2011 with a coefficient of -.117, which is similar to the original RDD
result of -.110. However, Figure 1.12, the graphical evidence of the year 2011 shows
that there is no significant change in the scatter plot. Before and after August 12,
2011, the probability of weapon possession among drug offenders is ranged between
0 and 0.3. The coefficient seems to be driven by three bins right before the cutoff
date, leading to upward sloping of the linear projection before August 12, 2011. On
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Table 1.8: Seasonality: weapon use in drug offense in border county
(1)
2000

(2)
2001

(3)
2002

(4)
2003

(5)
2004

(6)
2005

(7)
2006

0.00754
(0.0335)

-0.0388
(0.0295)

0.00228
(0.0316)

-0.0183
(0.0156)

0.00679
(0.0138)

0.0217
(0.0212)

0.00997
(0.0207)

Observations
MSE-optimal Bandwidth
Eff Obs in Given Bandwidth

2,788
197.8
339

3,165
197.8
460

3,588
197.8
474

4,063
197.8
537

4,389
197.8
587

4,440
197.8
723

4,263
197.8
679

Year

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

0.0325
(0.0340)

0.0159
(0.0339)

0.0149
(0.0425)

0.0277
(0.0326)

-0.117**
(0.0538)

0.000618
(0.0428)

-0.110**
(0.0456)

3,847
197.8
552

3,453
197.8
473

3,172
197.8
462

2,988
197.8
399

2,906
197.8
403

2,928
197.8
400

2,929
197.8
372

Year
β

β

Observations
MSE-optimal Bandwidth
Eff Obs in Given Bandwidth

Notes: The table reports the coefficient of β in Equation 1.1 with an articial date of the Holder
memo. Each column represents the artificial year of the Holder Memo, thus it changes from Aug.
12, 2000 to Aug. 12 2013. The month and day of the artifical Holder Memo is fixed to Aug. 12.
The bandwidth is fixed as 197.8, the same level of the estimation 2013. The RDD estimating option
is idential to Table 1.4 (see the notes).
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Figure 1.12: RDD drug offense: border counties cut off date 8/12/2011
Notes: This figure is a graphical evidence of the result in Table 1.8 when the artificial year of the
Holder Memo is 2011. The cut off date is Aug. 12, 2011. See Figure 1.5 for a general description of
the RD plots.
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average, the probability of weapon possession around August 12, 2011, does not show
a structured break nor a discontinuity.

1.6.3

Difference-in-Discontinuity

A threat of the identification strategy is that the timing of the Holder Memo coincides
with time-varying unobservables.

These confounding factors may have driven a

reduction in weapon possession for drug offenders. For example, the border-line
agencies may have hired more officers to pursue low-profile offenders, or the criminals
in the area may have had trouble obtaining illicit weapons around the date of the
Holder Memo implementation.
I use a difference-in-discontinuity design (shortly diff-in-disc) to address these
potential confounding factors. This method combines the features of the regression
discontinuity design and difference-in-difference design. The diff-in-disc can isolate
the causal effect of one policy out from another policy. For example, if the new hiring
of police officers begins on the same date as the Holder Memo, the RDD estimates the
effect of the Holder Memo and the new hiring. To cancel out the confounding effect,
the diff-in-disc estimates two RDD: one for drug offenses and the other for non-drug
offenses. Then diff-in-disc takes the difference between the two RDD estimators. I
exploit that the effect of the new hiring exists in both types of offenses, but the Holder
Memo only in the drug offenses. Therefore, diff-in-disc subtracts out the confounding
factors specific to the border counties and captures the effect of the Holder Memo.
Similarly, the diff-in-disc controls the confounding factors related to drug crimes
in Florida by differencing RDD estimators between the border and non-border
counties.14 This diff-disc cancels out confounding factors related to drug crimes. For
example, defense attorneys aimed to remove the weapons charge after the Holder
14

The identifying assumption in diff-in-disc is that the effect of new hiring on drug criminals is equal
to non-drug offenders. The identifying assumption requires parallel trends of the dependent variable
in drug and non-drug offender groups. However, it is more local than the standard parallel trend
assumption in difference-in-difference: only around the cutoff date.
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Memo because their clients could serve fewer years in prison. This confounding
factor exists in both border and non-border counties. However, the effect of the
Holder Memo prevails only in the border counties. Therefore, subtracting the RDD
estimator of non-border counties from that of border counties eliminates the attorney
confounding factor. Another drug crime confounding factor is sample selection. I
have shown that the number of federal drug offense cases decreased in both border
and non-border counties. By subtracting the RDD estimator of non-border counties
from that of the border counties, the diff-in-disc estimator also addresses the sample
selection issue.
The diff-in-disc estimator is following,
τDDRD,border = βRD,border,drug − βRD,border,non−drug

(1.3)

The diff-in-disc estimator, τDDRD , takes a difference between the RD estimator of drug
crimes (βRD,border,drug )and non-drug crimes (βRD,border,non−drug ) in the border counties.
To cancel out state-level confounding factors, yet still specific to the drug crimes, the
diff-in-disc estimator subtracts the RD estimator of the non-border county from the
border county. In other words, τDDRD,state = βRD,border,drug − βRD,non−border,drug where
βRD,border,drug is RD estimator of border county for drug offenses and βRD,non−border,drug
is of non-border county for drug offenses.
Table 1.9 shows that the diff-in-disc results are similar to the original RDD. The
first column addresses confounding factors in the border counties by comparing drug
and non-drug crimes. The diff-in-disc finds -0.169, which is a larger reduction of
weapon possession than the original RDD of -0.11. That means that the probability
of weapon possession in other crimes begins to increase around the Holder Memo
date. This could explain why the effect of the Holder Memo remains only in the short
run. The criminal environment in the border counties requires weapons.
The second column reports the diff-in-disc estimate specific to the drug crimes
in Florida. Here, I compared RDD estimators between the border and non-border
counties only using drug offenses. This addresses confounding factors related to drug
40

Table 1.9: Diff-in-disc estimation
(1)
(2)
MSE-optimal BW
Drug vs non-Drug
Border vs non-Border

(3)
(4)
Constand BW
Drug vs non-Drug
Border vs non-Border

Diff-in-Disc estimator

-0.169***
(0.0644)

-0.129**
(0.0567)

-0.154*
(0.0786)

-0.112*
(0.0642)

Observations
Eff Obs Below Cutoff
Eff Obs Above Cutoff
Bandwidth

2,486
877
789
201.4

7,036
3170
3126
179.9

2,430
852
775
197.8

7,803
3537
3463
197.8

Notes: This table report diff-in-disc estimator from Equation 1.3. The first and third column
compares RD estimator between drug and non-drug crimes and the second and fourth column
between border and non-border counties.
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crime in Florida. The estimate is -0.129, similar to the original RDD, and it becomes
almost identical to the original RDD by matching the bandwidth. In the last column,
I set a constant bandwidth, the same length as the original RDD. The diff-in-disc
coefficient is -0.112, similar to the original RDD, -0.110. This result also supports that
the sample selection is not driving the reduction of weapon possession. In Figure 1.11,
the number of federal drug cases decreased in border and non-border counties after
the Holder Memo. This means that the sample selection issue may occur in both
regions. However, the diff-in-disc result shows that this confounding factor may not
exist.

1.6.4

Sample Period Restriction

The sample period of this study is restricted to before and two years after the Holder
Memo started. In cross-sectional analysis, more samples reduce standard error and
find more robust estimates. But in RDiT, where the running variable is time, more
observations around the cutoff date may cause a biased estimate due to the existence
of auto-regressive variation or the disparity of the short-run and long-run effect (see
Hausman and Rapson 31).
Another issue that I have found is that MSE-optimal bandwidth tends to be too
large when a longer sample period is used. autoreftab:restriction shows the RDD
estimating coefficient β in Equation 1.1 across different sample periods. Column 1
shows the change in probability of weapon possession for drug offenders (Same as
Panel A Column Table 1.4) in border counties with a restricted sample period of
±2 years of the onset of the Holder Memo. The coefficients for ± 3 years and the
non-restricted case (using the sample from 1996 to 2019) are different from that of
± 2 years. This disparity can be attributed to the different ranges of MSE-optimal
bandwidth. For ± 2 years, the optimal bandwidth is 197.8 days, whereas it is 375.9
days for ± 3 years and ± 574.6 days for the non-restricted case. The longer period
of bandwidth dampens the short-run effect of the Holder Memo.
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The main RD result indicates that the effect of the Holder Memo is short-lived.
Figure 1.4 shows the annual trend of weapon possession is upward sloping. However,
RDD estimates a 10 percentage points decrease in weapon possession within ± 197.8
days in the short run. Such a drop is more prominent in the shorter period of ±
100 days (see Figure 1.6). This may explain the reason why Table 1.10 shows that
the absolute value of RDD coefficient decreases from -0.11 to -0.0553 as the optimal
bandwidth increases.

1.6.5

Possibility of a long-run effect of the Holder Memo

Although the long-run effect of the Holder Memo is beyond the scope of the current
study, I provide suggestive evidence that the policy may have an impact on reducing
weapon possession by up to 600 days. Figure 1.5 shows the discontinuity of weapon
possession in the border county, reducing the weapon possession around the cutoff
date. However, the gradient of the linear projection is still positive before and after
the policy. Without a long-run counterfactual group for the border county, it is
unknown whether the Holder Memo ever changes the gradient in the long run. This
study can simply provide how the Holder Memo impacts the weapon possession in the
long run in the border county relative to the non-border county since the short-run
effect of the Holder Memo is only observed in the border county.
Table 1.11 shows the same difference in difference-in-discontinuity in Equation 1.3
with from 150 to 600 days as the bandwidth. This estimator explains how long
the Holder Memo affects the border county’s weapon possession relative to the nonborder county. The first column in the table shows the differences in RD estimators
between the border and non-border counties with 150 days of bandwidth. A negative
coefficient means that the weapon possession is decreased more in the border counties
than the non-border county. I increase the bandwidth up to 600 days before and after
the Holder Memo. The magnitude is gradually decreased as the bandwidth increases,
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Table 1.10: Data restriction: weapon use in drug offense border county
(1)
± 2 years

(2)
± 3 years

(3)
No Restriction

-0.110**
(0.0456)

-0.0679*
(0.0351)

-0.0553**
(0.0281)

2,929
372
431
197.8
8.12.2011-8.12.2015

1,501
737
820
375.9
8.12.2010-8.12.2016

18,564
1170
1278
547.6
No Restriction

Restriction Period
β

Observations
Eff Obs Below Cutoff
Eff Obs Above Cutoff
MSE-optimal Bandwidth
Restriction Date

Notes: The table reports the coefficient of β in Equation 1.1 with different sample period ranges.
Each column represents the ranges of the sample period. The first column uses the sample two years
before and after the Holder Memo, from Aug. 12, 2011 to Aug. 12, 2015. The second column uses 3
years of sample before and after the Holder Memo. Last column does not restrict the sample period,
thus the sample starts Oct. 1, 1995 and ends Feb. 28. 2020. The RDD estimating option is idential
to Table 1.4 (see the notes).

Table 1.11: DDRD: possibility of a long-run effect of the Holder Memo
(1)

Diff-in-Disc estimator

Observations
Eff Obs Below Cutoff
Eff Obs Above Cutoff
MSE-optimal Bandwidth

(2)
(3)
Border vs non-Border

(4)

-0.0776
(0.0720)

-0.123**
(0.0557)

-0.0950**
(0.0484)

-0.0796*
(0.0427)

5,769
2588
2567
150

11,721
5142
5375
300

17,392
7767
7798
450

23,343
10682
10228
600

Notes: This table report diff-in-disc estimator from Equation 1.3. Each column compares RD
estimator between border and non-border counties with different bandwidth. A negative coefficient
indicates that weapon possession rate is lower in the border counties than non-border counties.
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but the coefficient is still negative. This result may indicate that the effect of the
Holder Memo eventually faded out, but it lasted up to 600 days.

1.7

Conclusion

The Holder Memo instructs federal law enforcement agencies do not apply minimum
mandatory sentences to unarmed, nonviolent, and non-organized drug offenders.
Using Florida OBIS data, this study found that drug offenders’ probability of weapons
possession decreased by 11 percentage points after the Holder Memo came into effect.
In contrast, when the Holder Memo was rescinded, there was no change in the
probability of weapons possession.
These findings suggest that criminal sanction affects the degree of harmful activity
that criminals choose to engage in. With the introduction of the Holder Memo,
criminals faced lower expected punishment if they did not possess weapons at the
crime scene. Further, the policy make drug crime less violent; criminals are less likely
to possess a weapon. This study suggests that a harsher sanction is an effective policy
tool in the context of marginal deterrence.
The results of this study also imply that criminals re-optimize their input selection
to minimize the cost of committing a crime. The economics of crime rarely discuss
the input of crimes such as weapons or violence. The Holder Memo changes the input
price, or the expected sentence on possessing weapons, at the crime scene. My result
present an optimistic view of the rational criminal model, and standard producer
theory may explain criminal behavior. Additionally, this re-optimization of behavior
can be seen as asymmetric: criminals show a behavioral change when the input cost
of a crime decreases (the onset of the Holder Memo), but no change is discernable
when the cost of a crime increases (the repeal of the Holder Memo).
However, this study finds that the effect of sanctions is relatively short-lived.
Criminals reduced the weapons possession rate in the first 100 days following the
memo, but they continue to carry weapons after this period.
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Chapter 2
Refugees and Crime in Germany
2.1

Introduction

Over 82 million people are forcibly displaced in face of life-threatening dangers. Syrian
war made 6.7 million refugees, political repression and economic collapse in Venezuela
forced 4 million people to leave their country. In August 2021, starting with the U.S.
withdrawal from Afghanistan civil war, 126,000 Afghans escaped from the country in
light of the Taliban offense. In 2022, the Russian and Ukraine war displaced over 3.4
million Ukraine refugees in March.1 These recent conflicts show how rapidly a new
displacement crisis can escalate within a month.
One of the largest flows of refugees is people fleeing from the Syrian war, a majority
headed to Europe, especially Germany. Between 2015 and 2016, Germany received
1.2 million refugees, the inflow amount to the entire population of Munich, the third
largest city in the country.
The conflict in the hosting country centers on a perception that refugees are
arriving unvetted and thus a potential threat to the community. In face of the Syrian
refugee crisis in 2015, former U.S. President Donald Trump described refugees as a
‘Trojan Horse’. During his presidential campaign trail, he said “We have no idea who
1

Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) the Operational Data
Portal (ODP). (link)
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these people are, . . . This could be one of the great Trojan horses.”2 The Hungarian
Prime Minister Viktor Orban argued that many of the Syrian refugees do not look like
war refugees, but “young men that look like an army.”3 The public also concerned
about the safety. According to a poll by German public broadcaster ZDF, 70 percent
of respondents think the crime will increase due to a large increase in refugees in 2016.
The skepticism about the refugee escalated to a debate on closing borders to
incoming refugees. The debate became more intense after a rise in refugee crime
counts in Germany. The leader of SPD, one of the major political parties in Germany,
Martin Schulz asks a critical question, “What would we do with the first refugee to
reach the European border once the quota is reached? Would we send them back
to a certain death? As long as this question hasn’t been answered, a debate about
[an upper limit of refugee quota] does not make sense.”4 The majority of political
party support refugees and the 64% Germans still trust pro-refugee parties and their
refugee policies in 2016.5 . In the end, Germany accepted 1.2 million refugees between
2015 and 2016.
The refugee crisis in Germany shows that an immigrant crisis starts with
skepticism and ends up impacting the immigration policy. The country opened
and closed its border to refugees. The monthly number of asylum applicants in
the country fluctuated from 30,000 to 200,000 in 2015. Many reasons are behind
this fluctuation, but refugee crimes are always one of the arguments for regulating
immigration. Therefore, it is important to understand the causal relationship between
refugees and crimes.
In addition, estimating the causal relationship between refugees and recorded
crimes is important for establishing a future immigration policy. As a new population
2
Kopan, Tal. ”Donald Trump: Syrian refugees a ‘Trojan horse’” CNN, November 16, 2015.
(link)
3
Riegert, Bernd. ”Europe’s conservatives fight over Merkel’s refugee speech” Deutsche Welle
(DW), October 23, 2015. (link)
4
Bierbach, Mara. “AfD, CDU, SPD: Where do German parties stand on refugees, asylum and
immigration?” Deutsche Welle (DW), September 24, 2017.(link)
5
Scholz, Kay-Alexander. ”Nationwide German poll: Merkel’s popularity dips to five-year low”
Deutsche Welle (DW), January 9, 2016. (link)
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comes, it is natural for crime counts to increase regardless of the newcomer’s age, sex,
religion, or nationality. To optimize immigrant policy, the countries need to calculate
the cost of hosting newcomers, including the cost induced by crimes.6 The direct cost
alone includes police protection costs, legal and adjudication costs, and corrections
costs. Misunderstandings regarding the crime counts attributed to immigrants may
lead to suboptimal immigrant policy; countries overestimating the cost may host too
few immigrants. Underestimation may result in accepting an excessive number of
immigrants, imposing a further financial burden on taxpayers. The fundamental of
the cost calculation rests on the crime counts attributed to the incoming population.
The relationship between immigrants and crime is well-established literature,
but estimating the crime effect of refugees has suffered from a lack of suspect-level
data. The literature often measures the crime effect of immigrants using changes
in the country’s aggregate crime rate as the outcome of interest, instead of crimes
committed by immigrants or refugees themselves (Alonso-Borrego et al. 2, Bianchi
et al. 9, Bell et al. 7). Mechanically, evaluating the effect of an influx of immigrants
on the aggregate crime rate effectively asks whether the crime rate of the incoming
population is different from the crime rate of the existing population. Thus, even if
the immigrant crime rate is constant across receiving countries, if the crime rate of
the native population is high, immigrants will be found to have a negative effect on
crime, and vice versa. In addition, aggregate crime rates as the outcome of interest
cannot identify the source of crime. It cannot distinguish between immigrants as
perpetrators, immigrants as victims, or immigrant presence resulting in additional
native-on-native crime.
This study estimates the expected crime per refugee using perpetrator-level data.
I use novel data on the immigration status of accused parties and estimate the effect
of refugee arrival on the number of immigrants and natives suspects in Germany.
To be clear, the crime data is not a neutral category. The state discretion factors
6

The E.U. expended 1.7% of gross domestic product on public order and safety in 2018. The
U.S. spent $295 billion on the criminal justice system in 2016, which is nearly $134,000 per person
detained.
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into the crime and conviction numbers – in the worst case the data contains an
enforcement strategy prioritizing or concealing crimes committed by refugees. The
state discretion factors may include possible enhanced police surveillance near refugee
shelters, targeting specific groups in the population, and other types of problematic
social processes that went into producing crime and conviction numbers. The primary
interpretation of the result is not the likelihood of refugees committing a crime, but
the effect of refugees on recorded or pursued crimes in Germany. I acknowledge that
this recorded crime data may not be a random sampling of true crimes but influenced
by law enforcement investigation strategy. Therefore, the interpretation of this result
is limited to the refugee effect on the recorded refugee crimes.
To ensure the effect I estimate is casual, I propose a novel instrumental variable
based on the accommodation assignment of refugees early in the refugee wave. The
IV exploits the fact that the German government converted military facilities (MFs)
to emergency shelters for refugees when the number of incoming immigrants exceeded
the capacity of the existing accommodation. District with these facilities, which were
built before each refugee influx in 2015 and 2016, hosted significantly more refugees
at the peak of the influx. To ensure that MF districts are not correlated with crime
rates for other reasons, I verify that MF and non-MF districts have similar trends in
a host of socio-economic variables and refugee characteristics prior to, and even after,
the refugee influx.
I find one additional refugee crime count for every ten incoming refugees in the
2015/2016 wave. 2SLS estimates suggest that one percent more refugees in the
population leads to a 0.10% increase in recorded refugee crimes per capita. The easiest
way to interpret this coefficient is to consider very marginal changes in refugees while
holding the population constant, which makes the denominator of both refugee crime
and refugee per capita variables fixed. Then, for every ten incoming refugees, there is
one more crime attributed to refugees. A levels specification provides a very similar
interpretation: one crime for every 10.08 refugees. The crime effect of refugees mainly
appears in minor offenses. Within property crimes, the crime counts attributed to
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refugees in theft and burglary increases significantly, but neither in robbery nor violent
crimes increase.
The result suggests, however, that refugee arrival did not increase the overall
crime rate in Germany, not because their crime rate was the same as the underlying
population, but because the increase in crime counts attributed to refugees was offset
by a statistically and economically significant reduction in the crime counts attributed
to natives. With the arrival of refugees, recorded property crimes attributed to natives
decreased by 5.6%, with no reduction in violent crime counts attributed to natives.
These findings do not guarantee that unlawful activity is truly on the decline among
natives. These patterns possibly reflect the state’s production of crime numbers.
For example, it may be that the concentration of refugees within proximate military
housing makes for easy police surveillance and targeting but disincentivizes or reduces
police resources to investigate native crimes.
The finding suggests that the aggregate crime data may not be a sole reliable
source to study the expected crime counts attributed to immigrants. Recorded refugee
crimes are a small part of the overall crime rate, and crime counts attributed to
refugees are easily offset by crime counts attributed to natives or other subgroups
of the population. This result in this paper provides a possible explanation why
some aggregate crime based analysis showing a positive association between crime
and immigrants (Spenkuch 67, Bianchi et al. 9, Bell et al. 7), while others find no
significant relationship (Butcher and Piehl 11, Aoki and Todo 3, Chalfin 14).

2.2

Asylum Procedure: Refugee Resettlement Policy

Refugees’ residence in Germany is determined by the “EASY” national allocation
program. The allocation scheme contains two steps. First, refugees are resettled to a
transitory initial reception center (EAE) at a state where they can officially claim to
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be asylum seeker applicants. Second, they are sent to districts (county) within the
state. At the state level, the allocation quota is set by “Königsteiner Schlüssel”. The
formula for the annual state quota is based on the population and tax revenue of two
years ago, 1/3 · Populationstate,t−2 + 2/3 · Tax revenuestate,t−2 . At the district level, the
main criteria is the share of the population of each district with respect to the state
population. Germany aims to resettle refugees uniformly over 401 administrative
districts.
Asylum seekers are obligated to stay in the location set by the government until
the asylum process is over; on average the process takes 7 months. Violation of
this geographical restriction can result in a fine of up to EUR 2,500, and repeated
violations can result in further fines or incarceration up to one year. Refugees cannot
access the labor market until the application is accepted, but are offered shelter,
food, a monthly allowance, other social assistance, and more importantly, permission
to reside in Germany during the asylum process. Once refugees are granted asylum,
they can freely choose where to live and access the labor market.7

2.3

Identification Strategy

The main threat to OLS analysis of the relationship between refugees and crime is
that once refugees are granted asylum, they can migrate from district to district. If
their migration decision is a function of crime or other variables that correlate to
crime, OLS estimation is biased.
To address a possible endogeneity in OLS, I propose an instrumental variable
based on the location of military facilities which are occasionally used as emergency
accommodations for refugees. Germany had a housing shortage at the peak of the
refugee influx. The capacity of refugee accommodation in 2014 is around 362,850,
but the country had to accommodate additional 611,701 refugees in 2015. As a
temporary measure, the federal government provided the states and municipalities
7

Geographical restriction is imposed again if the refugee has committed a crime
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with military facilities as emergency refugee shelters free of charge.8 By November
2015, over 30,000 refugees were accommodated in military barracks.9 Therefore,
districts previously had military facilities host larger volume of refugees than their
quota. I identify the location of military facilities from the Center for Military History
and Social Sciences

10

The information includes the name of the property, address,

the year of installation and closure of the military facilities of the Federal Defense
Forces of Germany (Bundeswehr).
The IV does not capture states’ discretion in using MFs as refugee shelters due
to their attitude toward refugees or other unobservable characteristics of locations,
characteristics possibly related to policing behavior or criminal activity. The facilities
instrument that I am using is all available military facilities, not specifically those
turned into refugee shelters. Therefore, the variation of the IV depends on the
installation of these facilities for a military purpose, not on a renovation for refugees.
To prevent reverse causality, I select MFs installed prior to each refugee influx in
2015 and 2016. The data is restricted to the MFs that were installed after 1990, the
year of the German unification, since information on MFs in the German Democratic
Republic (or East Germany) is relatively scarce compared to that of West Germany.
I also exclude facilities unlikely to be used as refugee shelters, such as office buildings,
warehouses, and radar detectors.
Figure 2.1 shows that the districts with these military facilities (MFs) receive
a significantly higher share of asylum seekers during the peak of the influx. The
graph shows an unconditional average of asylums seekers per capita based on the
available MFs. The blue line (solid line) shows the annual average of AS per capita in
8

Kopan, Tal. “Bund will Ländern und Kommunen finanziell entgegenkommen” Der Tagesspiegel,
April 9, 2015. (link)
9
Although the exact data for the number of refugees living in military barracks are not available,
an approximate number can be found in government officials’ interview in a public broadcast. Rainer
Arnold, a defense policy spokesman for the SPD, interview with Deutsche Welle (DW).
Hille, Peter. “Flüchtlingshilfe: ’Die Bundeswehr tut viel’” Deutsche Welle (DW), November 2,
2015. ((link)
10
Military bases location database released by Federal Defense Forces of Germany (Bundeswehr)
(link)
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Figure 2.1: Unconditional trend of asylum seekers (refugees) based on MFs
Notes: The graph shows an unconditional average of asylums seekers (AS) per capita based on the
available military facilities (MFs). The blue line (solid line) indicates the average asylums seekers
per capita in the MF district. The red line (dashed line) shows that in the non-MF districts.
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districts with MFs. The red line (dashed line) shows that in the district without MF.
The trend in the groups is similar prior to 2014, but the share of refugees increases
more in MF districts in 2015 when the refugee crisis begins. District with MFs
hosted 0.2 percentage points more refugees per capita in 2015 which is about 400
more people. The gap reduces to 155 in 2016 and 149 in 2017. Possibly, most of
the available MFs were exhausted in 2015. In November 2015, SPD parliamentary
group’s spokesperson on defense policy mentioned that a further expansion of MFs
for refugees was not possible.11 The German military forces have around 260,000
personnel, whereas incoming refugees in 2015 reached 476,649.
I empirically examine whether districts with and without MFs have similar
recorded refugee crimes per capita and refugee counts prior to the immigrant crisis.
The identifying assumption requires that the availability of military facilities impacts
the share of refugees in the population (relevance), but it does not directly affect crime
(exclusion). I provide indirect evidence the IV meeting the requirement. I exploit
the timing of the refugee crisis and the installation of emergency shelters. The MFs
should predict the number of refugees per capita only during the immigrant crisis
when these facilities are converted to refugee shelters. At the same time, MF should
not be correlated with the crime (outcome variable) before the refugee crisis. To test
this, I regress the number of refugees per capita and the recorded refugee crimes per
capita on the MF dummy variable for each year.
The estimating equation is following,
X
Ydt−1
Ydt
−
=
βt 1{Y ear = t} · M Fd + (µs × µt ) + (ηdt − ηdt−1 )
popdt popdt−1
t

(2.1)

Ydt is outcome variables including recorded refugee crimes, the number of asylum
seekers (refugees), and other socio-economic variables in district d in year t.

I

normalized this variable by dividing district population popdt . This first-differenced
11

Hille, Peter. “Flüchtlingshilfe: ’Die Bundeswehr tut viel’” Deutsche Welle (DW), November 2,
2015. ((link)
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(FD) outcome variable best reflects the relationship between emergency shelters and
refugees. The MF districts accommodate an excessive number of refugees in the first
year of the crisis, but the level of overcrowding goes down faster than non-MF districts
once appropriated accommodations are built. M Fd is the instrumental variable that
equals one if a district has any available MFs prior to year t − 1, otherwise zero.12
The data shows that the M Fd is time invariant.

Therefore, I multiply the

instrumental variable with 1{Y ear = t} that equals one if the year of observation
is t, otherwise zero. The indicator variable is multiplied with the IV capturing the
relationship between the outcome variable and IV in year t.13 µs × µt is state-by-year
fixed effect to address the time-varying endogeneity or changes in refugee policies at
the state level. β estimates the difference of the dependent variable between districts
with MFs and without them for each year.
Figure 2.2 shows that the recorded efugee crimes per capita and refugee share
have similar pre-trends in MF and non-MF districts. The first figure in Figure 2.2
demonstrates the coefficient plots of βt s with the number of asylum seekers (refugees)
as the dependent variable. Prior to the crisis, both MF and non-MF districts have a
12

For example, Berlin has observations of M Fberlin s for the year from 2010 and 2017. If the city
has a military facility for the first time in 2013, then the data looks as follow,
District Year M Fd Year of MF installation
Berlin
2013
0
2013
Berlin
2014
0
2013
Berlin
2015
1
2013
Berlin
2016
1
2013
Berlin
2017
1
2013
By definition, M Fd should be a time varying variable, but according to the dataset, it is a time
invariant variable because only one district, Ennepe-Ruhr-Kreis (community code:5954), installed
their first MF between 2010 and 2017. In the rest of the districts, the M Fd is either 1 or 0 for all
years. In other words, most districts either never had military facilities or always have them between
2010 and 2017.
13
The equation estimates the OLS of the dependent variable on the IV based on the year. The
β2015 , for example, would have been estimated with OLS estimation only using samples of the year
2015. However, STATA will not include the state-by-year fixed effect in a single-year OLS. One needs
to transform the variable; subtract the mean of Yst from Ydt before running the OLS. 1{Y ear = t}
allows to estimate all βd s in the single equation above. Each βt s compares the outcome variables
between MF and non-MF districts each year. The purpose of this analysis is to test whether MF
and non-MF districts have different values and trends in outcome variables or not.
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Figure 2.2: OLS by year: refugee and crime
Notes: Note: this graph shows plots of βt s and 95 percent confidence intervals from the Equation 2.1.
The outcome variable includes changes in asylum seekers (AS), changes in AS per 1,000 people, and
changes in recorded refugee crimes per 1,000 people. The baseline βt estimates the difference in
outcome variables between MF and non-MF districts in a given year. The regression result table is
in Table B.1 in the Appendix

56

similar number of asylum seekers. But, in 2015, MF districts receive about 500 more
refugees than non-MF districts.
The second figure in Figure 2.2 shows the coefficient plots of βt s with asylum
seeker per capita as the outcome variable. Similar to the unconditional average trend,
the refugees per capita is significantly higher in MF district in 2015 when the refugee
crisis begins. In 2016, MF districts accommodate significantly fewer refugees than the
previous year compared to non-MF districts. βt becomes negative. This is explained
by the nature of emergency shelters. As the spokesman on defense policy mentioned,
the further expansion of military facilities for refugees is not much possible after 2015.
When MF-districts return to their standard refugee capacity, the changes of refugee
share decrease more than non-MF districts in 2016.
The last graph (third column) addresses the possible endogeneity of IV. The
identifying assumption requires that the IV is only correlated with refugee crime
rate through asylum seekers per capita. The graph shows that the refugee crime
rates between MF and non-MF districts are not statistically different during the low
immigration period. This is indirect evidence that the IV is not directly correlated
with the refugee crime rate. In 2015, when the MF districts hosted more refugees, the
recorded refugee crimes per capita in the region did not differ from non-MF districts,
but MF districts has lower recorded refugee crimes per capita in the following year
of 2016. Although the coefficients are not statistically different, this reduced form
analysis gives some indications of a relationship between refugees and crime when the
refugees per capita decrease in MF districts.
I further examine whether the IV is orthogonal to refugee and district characteristics that may affect recorded crime rates. Figure 2.3 shows the same reduced form
event study with different outcome variables. Refugees’ gender, age, duration of stay,
and the amount of financial supports are possible determinants for criminal activities.
The IV may not be correlated with the crime rate, but possibly correlated through
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Figure 2.3: OLS by year: control variables
Note: this graph shows plots of βt s and 95 percent confidence intervals from the Equation 2.1. In the
first row, the outcome variable includes changes in the ratio of female asylum seekers (AS), changes
in the ratio of adult AS, and changes in AS with higher assistance. The second row shows changes in
district characteristics, including population, foreign population, and native population. In the last
row, the dependent variables are changes in socio-economic characteristics such as unemployment
rate, GDP per capita, and social assistant recipients per capita. The regression result table is Table B
in the Appendix
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these covariates. The graphs in the first row show that refugee characteristics are not
statistically different from zero between MF and non-MF districts.14
The second row in Figure 2.3 tests whether demographics varied substantially
between MF and non-MF districts. The population in MF districts grows faster than
non-MF districts one average 500 more people in MF districts prior to the crisis.
When the refugee crisis begins, MF districts have 1,000 more people on average,
which is driven by an increase in the refugee population. The German population did
not relocate from MF to non-MF districts (or vice versa) even after the refugee crisis.
The sharp drop in population in 2011 is mainly driven by data correction; the German
census in 2011 revised down the population by 1.5 million, following the first census in
1990. The census found that the foreign population had been overestimated, which is
turned out 1.1 million fewer than expected.15 The discrepancy prevailed in the large
cities in Germany; Berlin found that 180,000 fewer inhabitants and Hamburg 80,000
fewer residents.16 These large cities have military facilities prior to the refugee crisis,
thus Figure 2.3 shows the MF districts lost more foreign population count in 2011.
However, this data correction is unlikely linked to refugee criminal acts. In addition,
I include the population as a covariate in all analysis.
The third row in Figure 2.3 shows that MF and non-MF districts are similar
in terms of the labor market conditions, income or productivity, and the poverty
level. The unemployment rate in MF districts is significantly higher in 2008, but the
difference is about 0.002%, which is not economically meaningful. GDP per capita
shows no difference between the two districts neither the recipients of social assistant
per capita, a proxy for the level of poverty.
Figure 2.4 tests a disparity in aggregated crime rates, police performance, or
either district has a higher share of foreign suspects. Districts with better police
14

Asylum seekers receive further assistance within the scope of SGB XII after the waiting period
of 18 months. The benefit for a single adult increases from e341 of basic service to e432 of SGB
XII in the 2020 standard.
15
“Germany revises population down from 2011 census” Yahoo News, May 31, 2013. (link)
16
“Germany’s population drops 1.5M to 80.2 M” Khaleej Times, May 31, 2013. (link)
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Figure 2.4: OLS by year: crime variables
Note: this graph shows plots of βt s and 95 percent confidence intervals from the Equation 2.1. the
dependent variables are changes in crime-related characteristics, including reported crime rate, crime
clearance rate, and the ratio of non-refugee foreign suspects. The crime clearance rate refers to the
percentage of identified suspects among all suspects known to the police. The regression result table
is Table B in the Appendix
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performance or engaging in racial profiling may record more crimes in data with
the arrival of refugees. This leads to a non-random measurement error. The first
graph shows differences in reported crime rates between MF and non-MF districts.
The difference reported crime rates (or aggregated crime rates) are statistically the
same in both districts before and after the refugee crisis.17 The crime clearance
rate is the percentage of cases where a suspect is caught or at least identified by
police investigation among all suspects known to the police. This variable measures
the overall police performance or is sometimes used as a proxy for the number
of police officers. The clearance rates are not statistically different between MF
and non-MF districts. The ratio of the non-refugee foreign suspects is the number
of foreign suspects who are not refugees divided by the total suspects. If police
are disproportionately targeting refugees for enforcement due to the existence of
emergency refugee shelters, MF districts may have a higher number of other foreign
suspects. First, police may not be able to distinguish refugees from other foreign
suspects at the early stage of investigation due to limited information on the suspect.
Second, the number of native suspects may decrease as a result of racial profiling,
while the ratio of foreign suspects increases. However, the trend shows no temporal
difference in the statistical difference in the ratio between MF and non-MF districts.

2.4

Data

This study uses district-level panel data for Germany including 401 administrative
districts.18 The years of observation are from 2010 to 2017.
17
The report crime data after 2014 do not include immigration-specific crimes, the violation
of geographical movement where refugees migrate from the government assigned residential area
without authorization. This victimless crime does not break public order and security, but the
inclusion of this crime may overestimate the criminal involvement of refugees. The data for the
immigrant specifics crime is only available after 2013. It is inseparable from total crimes before
2013.
18
Data is not a perfectly balanced panel. Districts in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, Saxony, and
Saxony-Anhalt do not have any observation for refugees, so they are dropped in all years. In the
analysis, around 24 districts are dropped each year.
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I use both the perpetrator-level data and aggregate overall crime for the dependent
variable. In both reported and suspect crime records, I exclude immigration-specific
crime from the total crime record. The violence of geographical restriction (VGR) is
an offense against the Residence Act, the Asylum Procedures Act and the Freedom of
Movement Act E.U. Newly-arrived asylum seekers are obliged to stay at a government
assigned residential area during the asylum process. The violation of this regulation
is the violence of geographical restriction. The main purpose of this paper is to see
whether hosting refugees threatens public safety, but VGR itself does not explain the
public safety level. Due to data limitation, reported crimes before 2013 include VGR.
The aggregate crime data (or reported crime) contains every offense known to the
police. Multiple acts by the same suspect are counted as one offense. If an offense
fits several categories of crime, it still counts as one offense. At the perpetrator level,
the study uses the number of criminal suspects who are asylum seekers (refugees).
The Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection in Germany defines a
suspect as “anyone who is suspected to have committed an illegal act after the police
investigation has produced sufficient indications of this.” For one offender suspected
of multiple crimes, he or she is registered separately for each category of the offense
but counted once in the total of offenses. This data can be acquired upon request
from the Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt) of Germany. Property
crime includes robbery, theft, and burglary. Violent crime includes assault, rape, and
murder. The right-hand side variable is the aggregate number of asylum seekers who
are receiving asylum benefits which include health care, food, accommodation, etc.
The Federal Statistics Office of Germany records the number of asylum beneficiaries
at the end of the year. The office also provides district level socio-economic variables
including GDP, population, and the unemployment rate.
Panel A in Table 2.1 shows summary statistics on refugee suspect variables. On
average, there have been 190 refugee suspects per district from 2010 to 2017. 99 of
them are property crime and 25 are violent crime. Among the property crime, theft
is the most frequently committed crime by refugees, about 75%. The share of refugee
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics
(1)
Mean

(2)
SD

(3)
N

(4)
Min

(5)
Max

.994
.492
.138
.369
.0197
.0101

2.098
1.026
.307
.735
.0633
.0226

3,018
3,018
3,018
3,018
3,018
3,018

0
0
0
0
0
0

44.78
23.19
7.870
15.39
2.333
.439

All crimes
Property crime
Violent Crime

190.4
99.42
25.22

393.4
211.5
54.50

3,037
3,037
3,037

0
0
0

6,800
3,462
991

∆15−14 All crime rate
∆16−15 All crime rate

.00071
.00122

.00069
.00373

379
377

-.00185
-.00331

.00485
.04334

B. Reported crime 2014-2017
All crimes per 1000 people
Property crime per 1000 people
Violent Crime per 1000 people
All crimes
Property crime
Violent Crime

60.49
36.46
1.948
14,333
9,527
463.2

25.07
20.25
.975
32,182
24,751
1,037

1,599
1,599
1,599
1,607
1,607
1,607

21.68
7.595
.443
1,674
595
34

146.4
127.9
6.562
559,563
436,956
16,470

C. Crime by nationality 2010-2017
German suspect total crime
Foreign suspect total crime

4,356
1,510

5,956
3,383

3,037
3,037

580
40

93,296
54,150

D. Crime clearance rates 2010-2017
Crime clearance
Ratio of non-refugee foreign suspects

.607
.180

.0740
.087

3,235
3,037

.410
.017

.968
.498

E. Asylum seekers (AS) 2010-2017
Recipients of asylum seeker benefits
AS per capita
National inflow of AS
∆15−14 AS per capita
∆16−15 AS per capita

976.6
.00463
222,039
.00753
-.00348

1,917
.00506
229,769
.00773
.00809

3,219
3,193
4,284
400
398

1
.000004
33,033
-.00435
-.08843

49,654
.102
756,545
.08458
.00869

F. Demographics 2009-2017
Population
Foreign population
German population
GDP per capita
Unemployment rate
For. Unemployment rate

191,201
16,752
172,548
32,848
6.458
15.17

160,166
26,423
124,693
14,483
3.091
6.671

3,620
3,219
3,219
3,591
3,629
3,230

33,944
471
31,257
12,712
1.200
2.400

3,613,000
378,840
1,087,000
178,706
18.30
54.10

.656

.475

4,284

0

1

VARIABLES
A. Refugee crime 2010-2017
All crimes per 1000 people
Property crime per 1000 people
Violent Crime per 1000 people
Theft per 1000 people
Robbery per 1000 people
Burglary per 1000 people

G. Instrumental Variable
=1 District(county) has MFs

Note: The Federal Criminal Police Office of Germany collects criminal data for 401 administrative
districts in Germany. This data includes the total crimes reported to the local police office and the
total number of identified suspects. The office defines a suspect as “anyone who is suspected to have
committed an illegal act after the police investigation has produced sufficient indication of this.”
This study acquires a restricted data set, which includes the immigration status of perpetrators.
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suspects among all suspects is around 3% which is high given that the overall share
of the refugee population is around 0.5%. This indicates either refugee is more likely
to commit crimes, or the police focus on investigating refugee committing crimes. In
panel D, the crime clearance rate, the percentage of suspected who are arrested or
at least identified by the police among all suspects, shows that overall 60% of crimes
are cleared by the police. The next row shows that 18% of suspects are non-refugee
foreigners. Panel E shows that the average ratio of asylum seekers to population is
0.46%, around 976 people in an average district. From 2014 to 2015, asylum seekers
per capita increased by 0.07 percentage points. Given the national inflow of AS is
222,039, Germany widely resettles refugees over the country. Panel G shows that
around 66% of districts have military facilities (MF).

2.5

Empirical Results

To incorporate changes in the direction of the first stage in 2015 and 2016, I adopt
system 2SLS methods. The idea of a system 2SLS estimator is to estimate the fitted
value of linear regression of refugees on an MF indicator for each year separately, then
use the fitted value as the instrumental variable. Doing so, the new IV meets the
monotonicity assumption of the instrumental variable method since the MF districts
host an excess number of refugees in 2015, but the share of refugees decreases in 2016.
An alternative method simply multiplies by -1 for MFs districts and 0 for non-MF
districts in 2016, while 1 for MF districts and 0 for non-MF districts in 2015. The
result is similar in either method.19
The procedure of system 2SLS is as follows:

\ dt ) for each year. The estimating
Step 1. Predict the first stage fitted value (IV.AS
equation is
19

The result of alternative method is in Table B.4 in Appendix
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∀t = 2011, ..., 2017,
ASdt−1
ASdt
−
= γt M Fd + (ϵdt − ϵdt−1 )
popdt popdt−1
From the equation, estimate the fitted value
\ dt = γbt M Fd
IV.AS
\ dt as the instrumental variable
Step 2. Use IV.AS
First stage:
ASdt \
ASdt−1
′
\ dt + (Xdt−1
−
= γ1 IV.AS
− X ′ dt−2 )γ2 + µs × µt + (ϵdt − ϵdt−1 )
popdt
popdt−1

(2.2)

Second Stage:


ref.Crdt ref.Crdt−1
ASdt \
ASdt−1
′
−
=β
−
+ (Xdt−1
− X ′ dt−2 )γ + µs × µt + (ϵdt − ϵdt−1 ) (2.3)
popdt
popdt−1
popdt
popdt−1

The outcome variable is the number of refugee suspects at district d in year t
divided by the district population. The sample year t is during the refugee crisis
period from 2015 to 2016. d is the unit of observation, a district. The endogenous
variable is the share of refugees in the population subtracted by its lagged value.
The coefficient of interest is β representing the marginal effect of refugees on their
crime rate. Xdt−1 indicates lagged control variables including population, GDP per
capita, unemployment rate, and the ratio of foreign suspects. All variables are first
differenced to subtract time-invariant unobservable at the district level. To address
state-by-year unobservable, I include state-by-year fixed effect of µs × µt . The errors
are clustered at the district level.
Table 2.2 reports the estimated coefficients of OLS and 2SLS. The first column
shows the first stage regression. The MF districts host 0.533 more refugees per capita
than non-MF districts. The first stage produces F-statistics of 22.37. The second
column shows the 2SLS regression result of the difference in refugee crime rates on
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Table 2.2: 2SLS: refugee arrival and crime rates
First Stage
AS
− popdt−1

ASdt
popdt

\ dt
IV.AS
ASdt
popdt

−

dt−1

Second Stage (2SLS)
ref.Cr
− pop dt−1

ref.Crdt
popdt

dt−1

ref.Crdt
popdt

OLS
ref.Cr
− pop dt−1
dt−1

0.533***
(0.113)
AS dt−1
popdt−1

Observations
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic
Fixed effect

754
22.37

0.102**

0.0352***

(0.0491)

(0.00802)

754
22.37
State-by-year

754

Notes: this table reports the first stage and second stage of 2SLS from the estimating equation,
Equation 2.3. The first column shows the first stage outcomes, the second column shows the 2SLS
estimator, and the third column shows the OLS estimator. All variables are first differenced and I
include covariates and state-by-year fixed effect of µs × µt . The standard errors are clustered at
the district level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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the difference in asylum seekers per capita. The estimated coefficient of 2SLS is 0.102
which translates to one percent more refugees in population leads 0.102% increase
in refugee crime per capita or one refugee crime for every ten new refugees.20 To
be clear, this may not be interpreted as the likelihood of refugees committing crimes
since with the current data, I cannot prove that the enforcement strategy does not
factor into the crime data. The estimated coefficient can be interpreted as a change
in recorded refugee crimes.
Although the outcome variable is the number of suspects, not reported crimes,
this magnitude of the coefficient is comparable to reported crime studies. Reported
crime-based studies find the magnitude of the coefficient of crime rates on the share
of immigrants ranged from 0.4 to 1 (Bell et al. 7, Piopiunik and Ruhose 60).
I also report 2SLS results with an alternative transformation of the dependent
variable. Net change in crime is defined as

(Crimedt −Crimedt−1 )
.
popdt−1

This transformation

prevents a change in the crime rate from a change population after the refugee arrival.
The result is similar.21
The third column of Table 2.2 shows OLS estimates of the difference in recorded
refugee crimes per capita on the difference in asylum seekers per capita.
significantly different from zero and the magnitude is 0.03.

It is

The difference of

coefficients between OLS and 2SLS implies that unobservable characteristics of
refugee residential choice are negatively correlated with the crime rates; refugees
are possibly migrating to safer regions.
Table 2.3 shows the relationship between refugees and subcategories of crimes.
The outcome variable is the number of refugee suspects charged with specific
crimes divided by the district population. The estimating equation is identical to
Equation 2.2 and Equation 2.3. The biggest increase in property crime is theft, with
a coefficient of 0.047. Burglary also increases by 0.002. However, in robbery and
violent crime, recorded refugee crimes per capita do not increase.
20
21

The numerical method to interpret the coefficient β is in Appendix.
See Table B.6 in Appendix
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Table 2.3: 2SLS: heterogeneity in recorded refugee crimes per capita
ref.Crimedt
popdt

VARIABLES
ASdt AS dt−1
−
popdt popdt−1
Observations
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic
Fixed effect

dt−1
− ref.Crime
popdt−1
Robbery Violent Crime

Theft

Burgarly

0.0475**

0.00202***

0.00258

0.0115

(0.0185)

(0.000743)

(0.00226)

(0.00770)

754
22.37

754
754
22.37
22.37
State-by-year

754
22.37

Note: this table reports the 2SLS estimation from the equation, Equation 2.3. The dependent
variables are changes in sub-categories of recorded refugee crimes per capita including theft,
burgarly, robbery, and violent crime. The equation includes covariates and state-by-year fixed
effect. The standard errors are clustered at the district level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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2.6

Refugees and reported crimes

In this section, I show that using reported crime alone may fail to capture the increase
in recorded refugee crimes. The reported crime rate contains all crimes known to the
police including crimes committed by locals, refugees, and other foreigners. The
number of recorded refugee crimes affects the reported crime rates, but report crime
may not change in the same direction. If the existing overall crime rate is high, refugee
arrival may serve to reduce the overall crime rate, and vice versa. In addition, if locals
commit fewer crimes with the arrival of refugees, overall crime rates may decrease. I
run a 2SLS estimation to find the causal relationship between reported crime rates and
refugees. While maintaining the same IV and estimating equation of Equation 2.3, I
change the dependent variable to the total number of crimes reported to the police
divided by district population instead of immigrant crimes. The independent and
control variables are identical to the previous regression. Therefore, it maintains the
same variation in refugees as the previous analysis.
I find that reported crime does not increase even though the refugee crime rate
increases. In Table 2.4, the first column reports that 2SLS estimation with reported
crime rates as the outcome variable and a refugee per capita as the right-hand side
variable. The coefficient is insignificant, but the point estimate is -0.12. The second
column reports the effect of refugee arrival on the total number of German suspects
per capita. The native crime rate decreases by 7% as the share of refugees in the
population increases by 1%. The third column shows that non-refugee foreign crime
rates also decrease, although it is not statically significant.
The result is similar in alternative dependent variable of

Crimedt −Crimedt−1
,
popdt−1

where

Crimedt is the number of crime committed by natives or foreigners and popdt−1 is
the district population in the previous year. This transformation prevents a decrease
in native and foreign crime rates simply because of the increase in population. The
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Table 2.4: 2SLS: the effect of refugee on reported crime rate
dt−1
− Crime
popdt−1
German Suspect Non-refugee Foreign Suspect

Crimedt
popdt

Reported Crime
ASdt AS dt−1
−
popdt popdt−1
Observations
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic
Fixed effect

-0.152

-0.0700**

-0.0604

(0.104)

(0.0313)

(0.0505)

754
22.37

754
22.37
State-by-year

754
22.37

Note: this table reports the 2SLS estimation from the equation, Equation 2.3. The dependent
variables are changes in total crime rate and the number of suspects per capita . The suspect are
categorized by immigrant status. Non-refugee foreign suspects refers to foreign suspects who are
not asylum seekers. The equation includes covariates and state-by-year fixed effect. The standard
errors are clustered at the district level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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lagged population of popdt−1 does not include the newly-arrived refugees in the current
year.22
Combining the finding in Section 2.5, refugees did not increase the overall crime
rate in Germany, because the increase in recorded refugee crimes per capita was offset
by a statistically and economically significant reduction in recorded native crimes per
capita.
What drives the reduction in native and non-refugee crime rates? A possible
explanation is that law enforcement prioritizes refugee crime investigation and less
focus on native crimes. An under-resourced law enforcement system may decide which
crimes they should prioritize. The concentration of these refugees in the military
housing makes for easy police surveillance, which requires relatively fewer resources
for the refugee crime investigation than for native crime. When police performance
is evaluated by how much caseload is processed, the police may focus on relatively
easy cases – the suspects who are less experienced in escaping from police and have
less understanding of how police investigation is conducted in Germany. Many other
factors may play a role for states in making certain populations legible and other
populations illegible.
Within the framework of economic theory, I can test a hypothesis that refugee
arrival improves the local economy, thus leading to less financially motivated crimes
by natives. Table 2.5 shows that property crimes committed by Germans significantly
decreases during the refugee wave, while the violent crime rate does not change. This
indicates that the driving force in reducing native and non-refugee foreign crimes
is related to financial gains. German Housing Minister Barbara Hendricks said the
construction permit was issued for more than 380,000 residential buildings in 2016,
the highest number of permits issued in a year since 2000.23 However, I only find
partial evidence to support the hypothesis. The number of building permits with
22

See Table B.6 in Appendix
GCR Staff. “Refugee influx helps spur building boom in Germany” Global Construction Review,
January 17, 2016. (link)
23
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Table 2.5: 2SLS: sub-categories of crime committed by natives and foreigners
Crimedt
popdt

German Suspect
Property
Violent
ASdt
popdt

−

AS dt−1
popdt−1

Observations
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic
Fixed effect

−

Crimedt−1
popdt−1

Foreign Suspect (w/o refugees)
Property
Violent

-0.0562***

0.000414

-0.0273

-0.00549

(0.0168)

(0.00642)

(0.0265)

(0.00812)

754
22.37

754
22.37

754
22.37
State-by-year

754
22.37

Note: this table reports the 2SLS estimation from the equation, Equation 2.3. The dependent
variable is the number of property or violent crimes committed by natives or foreigners who are
not refugees. The equation includes covariates and state-by-year fixed effect. The standard errors
are clustered at the district level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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more than three dwellings slightly increased in MF districts during the refugee crisis,
but the former employment rate did not increase.24
Another hypothesis is that refugee arrival crowds out the native crimes. This
crowding-out effect can arise through multiple mechanisms. The refugee arrivals
crowd out the police resources of investigating native crimes. Alternatively, refugee
and native criminals may conflict over criminal territory or turf. In this case, the
immigrant criminals may push out local offenders to neighboring districts. The latter
hypothesis can be tested with the current data. The testable hypothesis is whether
refugee criminals crowd out the criminal territory in a district d, resulting in a lower
native crime rate in the district but higher in the neighboring districts. I estimate
the distance among all 401 districts in Germany and then identify the three nearest
districts for each districts. I use the same identification in Equation 2.3 with a new
dependent variable, an average native crime rate in three neighboring districts. I find
that the refugee arrival on district d does not increase the native nor non-refugee
foreign crime rates in their neighborhood. The point estimate is -0.036 for average
native crime rates and -0.003 for non-refugee foreign crime rates; both of them are
not significant. The 2SLS result is in Table B.8 in the Appendix.

2.7

Conclusion

When Germany received 1.2 million refugees between 2015 and 2016, the country saw
a rise in crime counts attributed to refugees from 38,119 to 83,737 in 2015. However,
the rise in crime counts attributed to refugees did not increase the aggregate crime
rate of the country; the overall crime rate in Germany dropped from 7.3% in 2014 to
7.2% in 2015. The country ingested over 40,000 crimes without increasing the overall
crime rate. This may indicate that the refugee crime rate equals the crime rate of the
existing population. Then, the overall crime rate can remain unchanged even with
a large volume of recorded refugee crimes. Alternatively, the observable crime rates
24

See the result in Figure B.1 in the Appendix
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may have a ceiling; the law enforcement is unable to clear up all reported crimes with
the current resources, thus the increase in crime counts attributed to refugees match
with a decrease in native or non-refugee foreign crimes.
The study aims to disentangle the effect of refugee arrival on the aggregate crime
rate through perpetrator-level analysis. Furthermore, to ensure the estimation is
casual, I use an instrumental variable constructed by the location of military facilities,
some of which are converted to emergency refugee shelters during the refugee crisis.
The IV produces a strong first stage outcome during the crisis and the study has
provided indirect evidence that the IV is correlated with the outcome variable through
the refugee population.
The findings suggest that the dominant party affecting the overall crime rate
upon the arrival of immigrants is not the immigrants themselves, but the existing
population. In Germany, the reduction of native crime offsets the increase in crime
counts attributed to refugees. The existing literature estimates the crime effect of
immigrants using the aggregate crime rate as the outcome of interest (Butcher and
Piehl 11, Aoki and Todo 3, Alonso-Borrego et al. 2, Bell et al. 7, Bianchi et al. 9,
Chalfin 14, Spenkuch 67). This study finds that evaluating the effect of an influx of
immigrants on the aggregate crime rate effectively asks whether the crime rate of the
incoming population is different from the crime rate of the existing population. The
result in this paper provides an explanation why literature finds inconsistent results
in the crime effect of the immigrants.
What is unknown in the refugee crisis in Germany is why native crime rates
decrease with the arrival of refugees. This study has proposed that refugees may
improve the local economy, leading to fewer property crimes committed by natives.
However, more evidence is needed to prove this claim.

In addition, I cannot

completely rule out the possibility of racial profiling has led to an increase in recorded
refugee crimes. This requires the information of suspects in the early stages of the
investigation.
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Chapter 3
The Effect of Child Support on
Female-headed Household:
Self-sufficiency and Labor Supply
3.1

Introduction

Family dissolution in the 1970-80s is thought to be one of the major contributors to
poverty. Over 30 percent of female-headed houses lived below the poverty line. In
general, the economic cost of divorce or separation falls more heavily on women
because they tend to end up as the primary caregivers and are less like to be
breadwinners.1 Therefore, divorce will significantly decrease mothers’ income. Child
support is designed to offset the financial burden of child-related costs following
separation or divorce. However, the payment is not always not made on time or
for the total amount. In the 1980s, more than half of single mothers did not receive
the total amount of the child support due to them, and one-quarter received nothing.
The federal and state governments implemented multiple child support enforcement
1
In 1980, over 60% of married women were not working, and even for working mothers, their
earnings only amounted to 22% of the total family income (Glynn 30)
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programs to improve child support collection. However, empirical evidence on the
effect of these programs on the female-headed household is lacking.
The financial hardship of female-headed households alarmed the government and
taxpayers, in part because of a rise in the public support rolls. [33] shows that 2040% of mothers with children received AFDC benefits two years after a divorce and
almost three-fifths of never-married mothers received AFDC benefits between 1967
and 1983. The federal and state expenditure for AFDC rose from $4 billion to $17
billion in actual dollars (in 1996 dollars) between 1970 and 1989. The share of the
expenditure for single parents accounted for 92-95% of the total expenditure (Dalaker
and Proctor 15).
To reduce single parents’ reliance on public support, the federal government
enacted the Social Security Act Title IV-D, the Child Support Enforcement (CSE)
program, in 1975. This program enabled federal and state governments to enforce
child support obligations. In the following years, state and federal governments
continued implementing major legislation to enforce child support payments. The
Child Support Enforcement (CSE) Amendment in 1984 required states to adopt
multiple enforcement programs emphasizing locating absent parents, establishing
paternity, collecting arrears, and expediting judicial and administrative processes.
From 1978 to 1990, child support collections increased 284 percent in real terms,
from 2.6 billion in 1978 to 7.3 billion in 1990 (both in 1996 dollars).
This paper studies the effect of the State Tax Refund Intercept (STRI) program
on single mothers and their children. STRI aims to improve child support collections.
The program intercepts state tax refunds of absent parents when their child support
payments are in arrears. When state child support agencies detect child support
arrears, a portion of the total amount of tax refund of noncustodial parents is
transferred to the agencies to pay those arrears. This paper provides a comprehensive
effect of STRI on mother and child outcomes.
The paper uses a nationally representative dataset to estimate the effect of child
support enforcement on mothers and their children. Current Population Survey
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Child Support Supplement (CPS-CSS) contains the most comprehensive child support
data in the United States and detailed answers regarding the child support payment
and amount. CPS-CSS is mainly cross-sectional data, but some variables contain
information on the past period, such as the years of child support agreement
established or the years of divorce.

I use the biannual March/April CPS-CSS

from 1982 to 1992 to estimate the effect of child support receipt on female-headed
households.
I exploit the staggered timing of STRI implementation and child’s age for
identification. Each state has different timing for STRI implementation, and some
states do not implement STRI because there is no state income tax. For the household
to benefit from STRI, their child must be under 18 years when the state implements
STRI. If a child in a state is already 18 years old at the year of STRI implementation,
the custodial mother does not get benefits from STRI. However, if the child was two
years old in that year, the mother may have more regular child support for the next
15 years (until the child becomes 18 years old). I estimate the expected years of STRI
treatment based on child’s age and the state’s STRI year. This hypothesis assumes
that the child’s age at the timing of STRI is exogenous; a mother is unlikely to give
birth predicting the state may adopt STRI in the future.
For empirical strategy, I employ a difference-in-difference model with the years of
STRI exposure as the treatment condition. The treatment households had a child
under 18 when the state implemented STRI, while the control group had a child over
18 years old. The second difference is based on whether I observe the household
before or after STRI. The surveys conducted before the state implemented STRI do
not contain the treatment effect, whereas surveys conducted after STRI show the
treatment effect. The first difference exploits the child’s birth year and STRI year,
and the second difference exploits the survey year and STRI year. Section 5 presents
an event study design to test the parallel trend assumption and provide evidence
that the timing of STRI and the child’s age is unrelated to pre-existing trends in key
outcome variables.
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The result shows that STRI significantly increases the likelihood of receiving child
support and improves the mother’s self-sufficiency and labor force participation. The
treatment group is 11% more likely to receive child support, and their annual amount
of the payment is $439 ($770 in 2022 dollars) higher than the control group.2 The
increase in likelihood and amount of child support improved self-sufficiency. Mothers
are 9% less likely to live in poverty following STRI adoption. Reliance on public
support, including AFDC, food stamps, and Medicaid, is significantly reduced due to
STRI.
This improvement in self-sufficiency may be the outcome of an increase in mothers’
labor supply. Mothers under the effect of STRI work longer weeks (6.5 more weeks),
and their wage income increased by $2.460 ($4,189 in 2022 dollars). This finding is
central to the debate on income assistance programs. Theoretically, universal cash
transfer deters labor supply if leisure is a normal good. However, [64] argues that
this theoretical prediction is weakly supported in the empirical literature. Recipients’
labor supply depends on the attachment to the current job or the presence of minor
children in the households. [40] points out that the size and duration of cash assistance
affect the labor supply. This study provides suggestive evidence that STRI may
alleviate family care constraints on labor supply. Treated mothers are 12% less likely
to report not working because of taking care of family.
Despite the effects on maternal labor supply, the evidence suggests that STRI
may not improve financial investments in beneficiary children and may not affect
educational attainment. Private insurance coverage, a proxy for financial investment
in children, is no greater in treated households. The child’s educational attainment,
such as school attendance or likelihood of finishing high school, also does not appear
significantly different between the control and treatment groups.

However, the

number of observations in the child-related analysis is significantly lower than in
2

The increased amount of the payment is possibly underestimated since the sample includes
households receiving zero child support. Conditional on receiving child support, the estimated child
support is $1,310 (the average child support for control groups) plus $439 a given year.
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the previous analysis because child-related outcome variables are only recorded in
the 1992 CPS survey. Therefore, the findings in this analysis are only suggestive.
This study contributes to several literatures in economics. Recent studies in
the child support literature find that child support enforcements decrease parental
marriage and increase non-martial fertility (Rossin-Slater 62, Tannenbaum 69). This
study provides evidence that child support enforcement improves mothers’ selfsufficiency and increases mothers’ labor force participation, possibly providing an
underlining mechanism for the decrease in parental marriage. In addition, the increase
in mother’s labor participation may explain why child support payment does not
directly increase child well-being (Knox 44, Rossin-Slater 62). [56] mentions that
previous research finds a negative relationship between child outcomes and maternal
employment.
This study also connects to a large literature on public support and labor force
participation. The major puzzle in the literature has been whether public support
programs deter labor force participation. For policymakers, the challenge has been
designing a redistribution scheme with minimum distortion to labor supply. In fact,
the empirical literature has shown a pattern between public programs and labor
supply, especially maternal labor participation. AFDC/TANF programs tend to
increase public assistant reliance and reduce labor supply by 10 to 50% (Hoynes
35, Hoynes et al. 36, Moffitt 53, Kang et al. 41). Food stamp receipt also decreases
maternal labor supply, especially for single mothers (Hoynes and Schanzenbach 37).
Childcare and public-school programs show a fairly consistent result on increasing
labor supply of mothers not only in U.S. but also cross countries (Averett et al. 4,
Lefebvre and Merrigan 48, Bauernschuster and Schlotter 5, Geyer et al. 27). This
study provides suggestive evidence that child support reduces the cost of taking care
of a family. These findings may imply that public support designed to reduce childcare
costs promote mothers’ labor force participation because mothers are likely to use the
payment to reduce the barrier of labor supply, such as alleviating the financial burden
of taking care of the child.
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3.2

Background

The most significant child support enforcement is the title IV-D Social Security Act,
the Child support Enforcement (CSE), in 1975. This federal policy aims to recover
the national expenditure of AFDC on single-parent households. States can collect
child support payments on behalf of the custodial parents and use the child support
to reimburse a portion of their AFDC expenditures.3 Under CSE, states and the
federal government initiates multiple child support programs to improve child support
collections. These include locating absent parents, paternity establishment programs,
and wage and tax refund garnishment for arrears.4
State tax refund intercept (STRI) collects child support arrearages by garnishing
noncustodial parents’ state income tax refund. When state child support agencies
identify delinquent accounts, they submit the names and Social Security numbers
(SSNs) to the revenue department. If the tax refund is due, a portion or total amount
of the refund is transferred to the child support agency to pay the child support
arrearage. The child support agency then notifies the noncustodial parents before
garnishing the tax refund. The child support agency has discretionary power to select
which arrearages are subject to collection. States can select any child support arrear
cases accumulated between $25 and $50 (Parle and England 59). In practice, a state
may not take any action until the arrearage accrues thousands of dollars (Kusserow
46). In the 1980s, calculating and updating child support arrears were done manually,
and the calculation was often inaccurate. Some states might not pursue collecting
child support arrearages if the child turns 18. The enforcement process becomes more
3

When a state initiates collecting a child support case, they can use 25% of this child support
collection to offset the AFDC for the first 12 months of collection. After 12 months, the state can
use 10% their child support collection
4
These child support programs are available to both AFDC and non-AFDC families. In the
mid-1970s, the federal government made CSE programs available to non-AFDC families to prevent
these families enter in the public support system in the future.
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complicated when the agency shares responsibility for the collection with another
jurisdiction.5
The state-to-state variation of STRI implementation was determined by federal
pressure, legislation lags, and fiscal stress. Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 show that many
states enacted STRI in 1985 when the federal government pressured states to improve
child support collection. Non-compliance to the federal guidelines would reduce the
federal funds on child support and AFDC. However, states without an income tax were
exempted from implementing STRI.6 Some states were granted implementation delays
since they did not have the necessary legislation to implement STRI. These states were
required to provide explanations for the delay based on their state statutes (Kusserow
46). The federal government provided incentives to states to comply with the federal
child support enforcement by reimbursing up to 75% of state CSE expenditures.
Fiscal stress was also a determinant of STRI implementation timing. In the early
1980s, many states operated under financial pressure due to the 1981-82 recession and
federal grant cuts. The passage of STRI was possibly a part of a revenue enhancement
strategy (Parle and England 59). My identification of the STRI effect is thus not solely
based on the timing of the policy, but I also exploit the child’s age at the timing of
STRI passage. This assumption is further explored in Section 3.4.
Besides STRI, many other child support enforcements were implemented during
the 1970s-80s, including federal tax refund intercept (FTRI), wage garnishment, and
mandatory wage withholding. FTRI is similar to STRI intercepting the federal
tax refund for arrearage. Many states adopted wage garnishment programs before
STRI. This policy garnishes up to 50% of absents parents’ disposable income when
their child support is in arrears. Mandatory wage withholding (or immediate wage
withholding) automatically collects child support payments from the noncustodial
parent’s paycheck. States implemented this policy during the 1980s-90s, but only six
5

For example, Nevada nullified thousands of dollars in arrears because the state has six years of
limitation for suing to collect debts.
6
Alaska, Connecticut, Nevada, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Wyoming
are exempted
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Figure 3.1: Number of states implementing tax refund intercept
Note: [38] provides the legislation years of STRI and other child support policies. [38] collects this
information from the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL-SLS) and Office of Child
Support Enforcement Legislative Tracking System Report (OCSE-LTSR).
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Figure 3.2: STRI year by states
Note: [38] provides the legislation years of STRI and other child support policies. [38] collects this
information from the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL-SLS) and Office of Child
Support Enforcement Legislative Tracking System Report (OCSE-LTSR).
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states met the required automated data systems by 1995. The years of implementation
of other child support policies are in Table C.1, Table C.2, and Table C.3 in appendix.
These child support policies are likely to complement each other rather than
substitute. States may need all these child support policies to collect the arrearages.
According to [46], the average earnings of employed absent parents is $8,719 ($23,297
in 2022 dollars). Those parents who earned more than $10,000 (26% of the sample)
owed an average of $5,050 in child support arrearages. The states may need multiple
programs to garnish $5,050 arrearages. For example, the IRS’s statistics of income
(SOI) show the average federal tax refund in 1990 was $672 ($1,478 in 2022 dollars),
which is only 13% of average arrears. The state tax refund was likely smaller than the
federal refund. Garnishment of the two refunds does not offset the total arrearages.
Wage garnishment may offset the entire arrears since child support agencies can
garnish up to 50% of absents parents’ disposable income. However, [46] shows that
out of 3,157 fathers who owe child support, 22.5% have no earnings. In practice,
locating absent fathers is challenging; they can change jobs frequently or work for
cash to avoid a child support obligation. In addition, wage garnishment may be
unsustainable. [26] shows that 70% of the absent parent fail to pay child support
again within three years after the wage garnishment.

3.3

Data

To analyze the effect of STRI on female-headed households, I use the biannual Current
Population Survey Child Support Supplement (CPS-CSS) from 1982 to 1992.7 The
survey aims to understand the characteristics of single-parent families. In addition
to the standard question in CPS, the supplement contains more detailed data on
single-parent households who live with their children 21 years and younger. The data
provides information on child support, including years of child support agreement
and the amount of child support, and other socioeconomic variables, such as public
7

[24] suggests that CPS-CSS surveyed before and after 1994 are not compatible.
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assistant program participation, labor supply, educational attainment, and basic
demographics.
The CPS-CSS is cross-sectional data, and the unit of observation is a femaleheaded household i with a single mother and one of her children. The total observation
i is determined by the number of mothers, not children. Since the mother has the
decision to allocate child support payment, the household outcome may be better
reflected in the mother-based sample.

In addition, the survey contains various

questions about labor force status, which is primarily available for adults. Since the
data does not tell which child the mother has a child support agreement, I choose the
representative child whose birth year is close to the year of child support agreement.8
Some households do not have the year of the child support agreement. In this case,
I use the year of the most recent divorce as a proxy for the child support agreement
year since it is a part of a divorce settlement agreement.
To prevent reverse causality and sample selection bias, I focus on children born
before the state implements STRI. Literature finds that child support enforcement
affects marriage and fertility (Rossin-Slater 62, Tannenbaum 69).

The parental

relationship affects the mother’s labor supply, self-sufficiency, and child outcomes. In
addition, this restriction helps to prevent sample selection bias, especially in removing
mothers who migrate from non-STRI states to STRI states.9 Finally, I select mothers
who gave birth at ages 15 and 50 and resided in the same state in the previous year.
I must note that the analysis may contain white noise since the data does not provide
their states of residence between the child’s birth and survey year. These restrictions
leave me a total of 5,410 mothers and children from CPS-CSS data.
8

If a mother has more than one child, then I select the child by the following equation,
M in(child birthyear − child support establishment year), and
(child birthyear − child support establishment year) ≥ 0.
9
The data may still contain the migrating mothers since they can move to STRI state after the
childbirth. If the mothers try to maximize the likelihood of receiving child support, their migration
also depends on the father’s location. In practice, inter-state child support cases reduce the likelihood
of receiving child support. To mitigate the sample selection issue, the main analysis employs another
exogenous variation, the timing of the survey. The detailed information is in Section 3.4
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Table 3.1 summarizes statistics of main variables, including demographic, child
support, public support status, labor supply, and investments in beneficiary children.
The sample consists of 21% black mothers and 9% hispanic mothers. The average
age of mothers is 39 years old and cohabits with 1.9 children. The average child’s age
is 12.7 years old. 94% mothers were not married at the time of the survey. Only 35%
of them received child support last year with an average amount of $1,423 in 1999
dollars ($2,455 in 2022 dollars). 32% of mothers live below the federal poverty line,
and 22% receive AFDC benefits. 77% mothers answered they worked last year for 34
weeks on average. 51% of them worked at the timing of divorce and separation. The
average salary is $15,385 in 1999 dollars ($26,500 in 2022 dollars).
The summary statistics show that the number of observations on the child
investment variable is significantly lower than other variables. Many of these variables
are only available in CPS 1992 survey. In addition, there are missing values because
the data comes from two different surveys. The CPS-CSS contains two surveys:
the standard CPS surveyed in March and the Child Support Supplement (CSS)
interviewed in April. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) matches
April CSS to the March CPS file. They note that some households in CSS were not
interviewed in March; thus, some variables are missing in CPS-CSS data. Therefore,
the main result of the analysis on the child investment part is only suggestive.

3.4

Methodology

This study aims to identify the effect of STRI on child support payment, selfsufficiency, labor choice, and child investment. I employ a difference-in-difference
(DiD) design to find the casual inference of STRI. The identification strategy exploits
two exogenous variations.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics (CPS-CSS data)
Demographics
black mother
hispanic mother
mother’s age
maternal age at the delivery
currently not married
number of own children
age of child
working at the time of divorce/seperation
working at some point 5 years before divorce/seperation
Child support
received any child support
amount of child support received (1999 dollars)
year of child support agreement or divorce
Public support status
below poverty line
AFDC recipiency
food stamp recipiency
food stamp: number of months received
Medicaid recipiency
living in public housing
Labor market
worked last year
weeks worked last year
wage and salary (1999 dollars)
full-time job
not working because of taking care of family
Child Investment
covered by private insurance
medicaid
received school lunch food subsidy
school or college attendance
finished highschool
weeks worked last year

mean

sd

observation

0.21
0.09
39.27
26.51
0.94
1.95
12.76
0.51
0.44

(0.41)
(0.28)
(9.03)
(5.72)
(0.23)
(1.07)
(6.34)
(0.50)
(0.49)

5,410
5,410
5,410
5,410
5,410
5,410
5,410
5,382
1,468

0.35
1434.64
1977.08

(0.48)
(3273.24)
(4.81)

5,410
5,410
5,410

0.32
0.22
0.29
2.89
0.26
0.14

(0.47)
(0.42)
(0.45)
(4.89)
(0.44)
(0.35)

5,410
5,410
5,410
5,410
5,410
2,850

0.77
34.29
15385.43
0.83
0.57

(0.42)
(21.90)
(15262.06)
(0.37)
(0.50)

5,410
5,410
5,410
4,181
1,229

0.50
0.27
0.58
0.57
0.53
18.09

(0.50)
(0.44)
(0.49)
(0.49)
(0.50)
(20.70)

711
5,410
2,989
707
969
2,125

Note: The CPS-CSS sample (N=5,410) includes female-headed households surveyed standard CPS
and Child Support Supplement (CSS) from 1982 to 1992. Each household contains one mother and
one of her children. This study estimates a child who is most likely the mother has a child support
agreement and matches the child to their mother. A detailed process to estimate the child is in
section 3.3. The data includes children born before the state implements STRI and mothers who
gave birth at ages 15 and 50 and resided in the same state in the previous year.
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3.4.1

Determine pre and post-intervention group

The child’s age at the year of STRI implementation determines pre and postintervention groups. Mathematically, I define a period variable as (BYis +17)−ST RIs
where BYis is the birth year of a child in the household i at state s and ST RIs is the
year when the state s implemented STRI. The difference gives expected years of STRI
treatment for the child until the child becomes 18. The negative value indicates that
the child is already 18 or older at the year of STRI; thus, the household i belongs to
the pre-intervention group. If the difference is positive, a household i is in the postintervention group. This hypothesis exploits two assumptively exogenous variations:
the state-to-state variation in implementing STRI and the pre-determined year of
childbirth.
The mother is more likely to receive child support with a positive period variable
since STRI is designed to reduce child support arrearages. Furthermore, the longer
the exposure to STRI, the more likely the mother will receive child support because
the state may intercept tax refund only if the arrear accrues to a certain amount.
On the other hand, a negative period variable indicates that STRI does not affect
child support collection for the household. An important thing to note is that some
states never implemented STRI since they do not have a state income tax. For
these states, I assign the hypothetical STRI year of 1985, which is the median STRI
implementation year. The main result is robust with or without these nontax states
in the main analysis.10

3.4.2

Determine treatment and control group

Regardless of the years of exposure to STRI, the timing of the survey will determine
the treatment and control group. For example, assume that STRI was implemented
in 1990 in a state. A child was age ten at the STRI year, which gives seven years
of treatment for STRI. However, if the survey was conducted in 1988, STRI was
10

The difference-in-difference estimator without non-tax states is Table C.4 in Appendix.
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ineffective during the survey year. Therefore, the outcome variables do not contain
the treatment effect of STRI. This hypothesis exploits the state-to-state variation of
STRI and the year of the survey.
Mathematically, treatment and control groups are divided by the following
formula,
• treatment group: Surveyis ≥ ST RIs
• control group: Surveyis < ST RIs or i living in the non-tax states.
Surveyisy indicates the survey year for household i in a state s. ST RIs is year
of STRI in state s. Treatment groups include households who have conducted the
survey on the year of STRI or after that. Control groups are households who were
surveyed before STRI was implemented in their state of residence. Also, households
that live in the nontax states are assigned to the control group, where I set 1985 as
the hypothetical STRI year.

3.4.3

Parallel trend assumption

The differences in outcome variables between the treatment and control groups should
be constant over the pre-intervention period. I propose an event study design to test
this parallel trend assumption over STRI exposure.
The estimating equation is,
Yisty =β0 Disy +

−1
X

θk · striistk · Disy +

k=−10

15
X

θk · striistk · Disy

k=1

(3.1)

+ µs + µt + µy + µcsyear + (µs × y) + ϵisty
For each household i, in state, s, in survey year t, and childbirth year y, Yisty is
an outcome variable of the household such as child support recipiency and amount
of child support. Disy is an indicator for treatment and control group: it equals one
for households I observe after STRI and zero for households I observe before STRI.
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striistk is a dummy variable that equals one if the household has k years of STRI
exposure, zero otherwise. The baseline STRI exposure is k = 0, which means a child
was 17 in the year of STRI implementation. θk estimates the difference in outcomes
variables between the control and treatment groups at k years of STRI exposure
relative to k = 0. The equation has multiple levels of fixed effects: state level (µs ),
survey year (µt ), and childbirth year (µy ). µs × y shows the state linear time trend
by childbirth year. ϵisty is the error term clustered at the state level.
Equation 3.1 tests whether the control and treatment groups have a constant
difference in outcome variables without STRI implementation. The θk s show whether
the two groups have different trends in pre-intervention periods for k < 0 and postintervention period for k > 0. For k < 0, both treatment and control groups are
not under the effect of STRI because the negative value implies that the child was
already 18 or older when the state implemented STRI. Thus, θk are expected to be
zero in pre-intervention periods. If STRI has an impact on the household, θk should
be nonzero for k > 0. In this post-intervention period, both groups had households
with a child under 18 at the timing of STRI. However, households in the treatment
group have outcome variables measured after STRI and the control group before STRI
–also, control groups have outcomes measured in states without an income tax. θk
provides indirect evidence of whether the child’s age and the timing of STRI create
an exogenous variation.
Figure 3.3 shows that the likelihood of receiving child support during the preperiod is constant between treatment and control groups. It plots θk and 95 percent
confidence intervals from the Equation 3.1. θk s ranges from k = −10 to k = 15. θ−10
indicates the differences in outcome variable between treatment and control groups
whose child is expected to be 27 years old when the state legislated STRI. The baseline
θ0 indicates the child was 17 years old when the state implemented STRI. θ15 means
that the child was two years old at the STRI year; thus, the state is able to garnish
child support arrears for 15 years for the treatment group.
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Figure 3.3: Mother received any child support last year
Note: this figure plots θk s and 95 percent confidence intervals from the Equation 3.1. The outcome
variable is the likelihood of mothers receiving child support. The baseline θ0 estimates the difference
in outcome variables between control and treatment groups. The rest of θk estimates the same
difference relative to the baseline θ0 .
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Overall, treatment and control groups have a constant difference during the preintervention period. In the pre-period, the two groups’ difference is not statistically
different from the baseline, k = 0. The post-intervention period shows that the
treatment groups are more likely to receive child support payments. A gradual
increase in θk s in the post-intervention period may reflect that child support agencies
start to collect arrears when the debts reach a certain amount. Also, STRI may
have implementation lags since tax intercept requires cooperation among IRS, state
child support agencies, and other local agencies.

For θ−2 being a significantly

negative value, this may have to do with the baseline k. Since the current data
does not provide a child’s accurate birth year, I use proxy birth year, Survey year −
Child age at the timing of survey − 1. The proxy does not consider the month of
STRI legislation and the child’s birth. So, even if k = 0, some children may have one
year of STRI exposure depending on the month of the survey, childbirth, and STRI
legislation. Figure C.1 in the appendix shows an alternative event study with k = −1
as the baseline year. This new baseline model shows that θk s are indistinguishable
from zero in pre-intervention periods and have a more significant impact on STRI in
post-intervention periods.11
Figure 3.4 shows the event study plot of the amount of child support received
in pre and post-intervention periods. Similar to the earlier graph, the difference in
the amount of payment is constant between the treatment and control groups in
the pre-intervention period. For the post-intervention period, the payment becomes
larger for the treatment group starting from the 7th year of STRI exposure, and it
becomes smaller from the 13th year. This could mean that the effect of STRI in the
intensive margin is not persistent. However, the further interpretation of this event
11
In addition, I re-estimate the event study with a hypothetical STRI implementation year for
each state. The new STRI years are 5 or 10 years earlier than the original year of STRI. This
hypothetical year affects both pre-and post-intervention groups. Some households in the new preintervention group are used to be in the post-intervention group. Figure C.2 in appendix shows that
the hypothetical STRI does not produce parallel trend, which suggests that the actual exposure to
STRI affects the child support receipt rate.
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Figure 3.4: Amount of child support received in 1999 dollars
Note: this figure plots θk s and 95 percent confidence intervals from the Equation 3.1. The outcome
variable is the amount of child support in 1999 dollars. The baseline θ0 estimates the difference
in outcome variables between control and treatment groups. The rest of θk estimates the same
difference relative to the baseline θ0 .
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study may not be informative since this payment amount is not cumulative, but it is
only measured one time for each household.
Figure 3.5 shows that at least observable trends are not driving the child support
payment improvement after STRI. These six plots show θk from Equation 3.1 with
demographic dependent variables, including the mother’s race, age, educational
attainment, and previous labor force participation. The plot shows that the difference
in mother’s characteristics is constant between the control and treatment groups
during pre and post-intervention periods.

3.4.4

Difference-in-difference design

For the main analysis, I employ a difference-in-difference design. The treatment and
control groups are determined by the timing of survey, whether I observe a household
before or after STRI. The intensive margin variable, pre and post-intervention, is
determined by the expected years of STRI exposure.
The estimating equation is,
′
Yisty =γ0 Disy + γ1 T stristk + βDisy · T stristk + Xisty
γ2 +

X

j
CSpolisty

j

(3.2)

+ µs + µt + µy + µcsyear + (µs × y) + ϵisty
The observation unit is a household i in a state s, surveyed in year t, and with
a child born in year y. Yisty is an outcome variable in the household such as child
support recipiency, public support participation, mother’s labor participation, and
child investment. Disy is a dummy variable equal to one if the household is in the
treatment group, otherwise zero. T stristk becomes one when a household is in a
pre-intervention period or post-intervention period, and zero otherwise. β is the
difference-in-difference estimator: the first difference is between treatment and control
group and the second difference is between pre and post intervention group.
′
Xisty
is a set of covariates including demographics of the mother such as age
′
and race. Xisty
also includes state-level controls such as population, employment,
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Figure 3.5: Demographics
Note: the figures plot θk s and 95 percent confidence intervals from the Equation 3.1. The outcome
variables include mothers’ race, age at the delivery, educational attainment, and previous working
experience. The baseline θ0 estimates the difference in outcome variables between control and
treatment groups. The rest of θk estimates the same difference relative to the baseline θ0 .
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gross state product, income, public assistant receipt, the average benefits of AFDC,
food stamp, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Earned income tax credit (EITC),
j
Medicaid, etc. CSpolisty
indicates the household’s exposure to other child support

policies including paternity establishment, child support garnishment, and child
support guideline programs.12

The variable is generated in an identical way to

j
j
is
where BYisty is the birth year of a child and P olsy
STRI, (BYisty + 17) − P olsy

the year of legislation of child support policy j. The rest of the equation is identical
to Equation 3.1. The error term, ϵisty , is clustered at the state level.
Table 3.2 shows the result of the sensitivity analysis of DiD estimator. The result
suggests that the DiD estimator is consistent in unrestricted and restricted models.
The outcome variable is whether household i received child support last year. The
first column in Table 3.2 shows DiD estimator without any covariates and fixed effects.
The next four columns show DiD estimator with control and fixed effects. Overall,
the DiD estimators range from 0.112 to 0.97. Note that adding control variables
and the fixed effect increases R-squared, indicating the control variables add more
variation to explain the outcome variable. The coefficient stability with more controls
and increased R-square suggests that the estimates are less likely to be driven by
unobserved variables (Oster 58).

3.5

Results

This section shows the effect of STRI on child support receipt, self-sufficiency, labor
supply, and child investment. The following tables show the difference-in-difference
estimate of β in Equation 3.2. All estimation includes control variables and fixed
effects specified. The standard errors are clustered at the state level.
12

I control the exposure of eight other policies. The detailed information is Table C.1, Table C.2,
and Table C.3 in appendix.
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Table 3.2: Sensitivity test: mother received any child support payment last year
(1)
VARIABLES
β

Observations
R-squared
Demographic control
State level controls
Other CS policies
FEs

(2)
(3)
(4)
received any child support

(5)

0.112***
(0.0268)

0.110***
(0.0258)

0.108***
(0.0227)

0.0968***
(0.0223)

0.111***
(0.0237)

5,410
0.031

5,410
0.088
Y

5,410
0.105
Y
Y

5,410
0.111
Y
Y
Y

5,410
0.162
Y
Y
Y
Y

Note: this table reports difference-in-difference (DiD) estimator β from Equation 3.2 with multiple
specifications. The outcome variable is the likelihood of mothers receiving child support. The first
column shows the baseline DiD estimator without covariates and fixed effects. Column (2) add
demographic controls. Column (3) includes state-level control variables. Column (4) adds the years
of exposure to eight other child support policies. Column (5) includes all control variables and fixed
effects. The standard error is clustered at the state level. ***p<.001, **p<.05,*p<.10, respectively.
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3.5.1

Child support

Table 3.3 shows that STRI significantly increases the child support receipt in both
intensive and extensive margins. Mothers are more likely to receive child support
payments by 11%, and the amount of the payment increases by $439 ($770 in 2022
dollars). The intensive margin estimate is likely to be underestimated given that
65% of mothers receive zero child support. The average child support amount in the
control group is $1,310 per year. That 11% of mothers who received child support
due to STRI would receive $1,310 plus $439 per year.
This result only shows an improvement in child support recipiency in a given year.
The treatment groups are exposed to STRI for 9.6 years on average. It is reasonable
to assume that those households have experienced a similar improvement in child
support in past years.

3.5.2

Self-sufficiency

Table 3.4 shows the STRI significantly improves a mother’s self-sufficiency. The
poverty rate of female-headed households is reduced by 9%. Mothers under the effect
of STRI are less likely to rely on public support, including a 7% reduction in AFDC,
8% in food stamps, and 6.8% in Medicaid. The STRI reduces the number of months
of receiving food stamps by 0.86 months.
A question is whether the result indicates child support substitutes for public
support. On the surface, child support and self-sufficiency seem close to unit elasticity.
STRI increases the likelihood of child support payment by 11% and reduces the
poverty rate by 9%. However, this seems unrealistic given the AFDC benefits were
much larger than child support payments.

In 1984, the annual average AFDC

payment was $6,300 in 1999 dollars ($10,728 in 2022 dollars), while the average child
support payment in my data shows $1,434 per year or $4,239 after removing nonrecipients. In addition, leaving AFDC or getting out of poverty means the families
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Table 3.3: DiD: the effect of state tax refund intercept (STRI) on CS payments
VARIABLES

(1)
received any child support

(2)
amount of child support received (1999 dollars)

0.111***
(0.0237)

439.8**
(172.9)

5,410
0.162
Y
Y

5,410
0.110
Y
Y

β

Observations
R-squared
Controls
FEs

Note: this table reports difference-in-difference (DiD) estimator β from Equation 3.2. The outcome
variables include the likelihood of mothers receiving child support and the amount of child support (in
1999 dollars). The estimation includes all control variables and fixed effects specified in Equation 3.2.
The standard error is clustered at the state level. ***p<.001, **p<.05,*p<.10, respectively.

Table 3.4: DiD: the effect of CS payment on public support reliance
VARIABLES
β

Observations
R-squared
Controls
FEs

(1)
poverty

(2)
AFDC

(3)
food stamp

(4)
food stamp (months)

(5)
medicaid

(6)
public housing

-0.0907***
(0.0313)

-0.0703**
(0.0270)

-0.0833***
(0.0260)

-0.884***
(0.278)

-0.0680***
(0.0251)

-0.0386
(0.0302)

5,410
0.227
Y
Y

5,410
0.230
Y
Y

5,410
0.215
Y
Y

5,410
0.216
Y
Y

5,410
0.228
Y
Y

2,850
0.158
Y
Y

Note: this table reports difference-in-difference (DiD) estimator β from Equation 3.2. The outcome
variables include multple measures of self-sufficiency such as poverty rate, AFDC Medicaid, food
stamps recipiency, and public housing. The estimation includes all control variables and fixed
effects specified in Equation 3.2. The standard error is clustered at the state level. ***p<.001,
**p<.05,*p<.10, respectively.
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also lose eligibility for food stamps and Medicaid.13 Therefore, the improvement of
self-sufficiency has to do with more than just an increase in the likelihood of getting
child support.
The findings imply that STRI has multiple channels to improve self-sufficiency.
Some families automatically leave the AFDC program due to this additional income
from child support.14 Table 3.3 shows that STRI increases the likelihood of receiving
child support by 11% and also the amount of the payment increases by $439. The
total effect of both intensive and extensive margins possibly amounts to over $1,600
per year, as I discussed in Section 3.5.1.15 How significant is this additional $1,600
for getting out of poverty? In 1985, the federal poverty threshold was $14,300 (in
1999 dollars) for a family of three. Thus, the household in poverty would experience
at minimum 11% of income increase.
Furthermore, STRI can lead to behavioral changes in mothers. Self-sufficiency is
contingent upon mothers finding a new source of income other than government cash
assistance. I find that STRI increases the mother’s labor supply. I will discuss this
in the next section.

3.5.3

Labor market

STRI increases the mother’s labor supply in both intensive and extensive margins.
The treatment group is more likely to enter the labor market and work longer weeks.
Table 3.5 shows that there were 13% more mothers who worked. The mothers in
the treatment group worked 6.5 more weeks per year. Earlier I find that STRI
reduces poverty by 9%, and this increase in labor supply may explain the underlying
13

The eligibility of Medicaid and food stamp depends on whether a family receives AFDC and
Supplemental Security Income (SSI). In the late 1980s, Congress mandated that Medicaid coverage
was determined by the federal poverty level (FPL). Similar legislation took place for food stamps in
1996.
14
AFDC families can keep up to $50 per month of child support, but the rest of the payment is
taxed at a 100 percent rate.
15
The calculation is based on the average child support payment for the control group ($1,310)
plus the additional payment of $439 from the tax refund intercept.
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Table 3.5: DiD: the effect of CS payment on labor supply

VARIABLES
β

Observations
R-squared
Controls
FEs

(1)

(2)

(3)
wage and salary
(1999 dollars)

(4)

worked

weeks worked

0.127***
(0.0300)

6.533***
(1.593)

2,387*
(1,260)

0.0182
(0.0302)

-0.113
(0.0807)

5,410
0.153
Y
Y

5,410
0.173
Y
Y

5,410
0.187
Y
Y

4,181
0.073
Y
Y

1,229
0.270
Y
Y

full-time job

(5)
not working
because of taking care of family

Note: this table reports difference-in-difference (DiD) estimator β from Equation 3.2. The outcome
variables include multiple measures of maternal labor supply such as employment status, weeks
worked, wage, full-time job status, and reason for not working. The estimation includes all control
variables and fixed effects specified in Equation 3.2. The standard error is clustered at the state
level. ***p<.001, **p<.05,*p<.10, respectively.
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mechanism. Table 3.5 also shows STRI increases the annual wage by $2,387 in 1999
dollars ($4,187 in 2022 dollars). The amount is possibly overestimated given that
many mothers have zero income. In terms of the quality of the job, I do not find
an improvement. The table shows that STRI does not increase the probability of
mothers getting a full-time job.
This finding deviates from the theoretical prediction that unearned income reduces
labor supply. Since leisure is considered a normal good, unconditional cash assistance
reduces the labor supply. However, some empirical studies find the opposite outcomes.
[64] suggests that a stronger attachment to the current job or the presence of a
minor child in the household may lead to an increase in the labor supply of public
assistance recipients. [40] points out that the size and period of cash transfer also
affect labor supply. The author argues that a small additional income may not deter
labor supply, and a long-run labor market response may differ from the theoretical
prediction. This study is able to provide suggestive evidence to support one of these
mechanisms. The last column in Table 3.5 may indicate that STRI reduces the
number of mothers who do not work because of taking care of family.16 The channel
is the child support payment is used to offset the cost of child care, which alleviate
labor supply constraints for single mothers. This mechanism is often discussed in
child care literature (Killingsworth 43, Averett et al. 4, Lefebvre and Merrigan 48,
Bauernschuster and Schlotter 5, Geyer et al. 27). I argue that my result is only
suggestive since the number of observations of the dependent variable is only 1,229.
I will provide a detailed discussion on this potential mechanism in Section 3.6.

3.5.4

Child Investment

I analyze the effect of STRI on child investment, educational performance, and labor
supply. However, this analysis has very few observations compared to the previous
16

Although the coefficient is not statistically different from zero due to the low number of
observation and high variance, the magnitude of the coefficient is 0.113, which is not negligible.
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analysis because many child-related questions are only recorded in the 1992 CPS
survey. This result is only suggestive.
I find no evidence that STRI improves child investment or child outcomes. Private
insurance coverage is often used as a proxy for financial child investment from parents.
Table 3.6 shows that STRI does not increase the likelihood of children being covered
by private insurance. The point estimate is -0.08 but not significant. The number of
observations is only 711. Medicaid coverage is reduced by 5.6%. The likelihood of
receiving a school lunch subsidy is not significantly different between the treatment
and control groups, although the point estimate is -0.13. STRI does not impact the
child’s school attendance; the coefficient is -0.1 but not statistically different from
zero, and the number of observations is only 707. The likelihood of finishing high
school is more prominent in the treatment group by 0.22 but not significant. This
analysis only contains children who are 18 or older. Child labor supply is also not
statistically different between the treatment and control groups.

3.6

Channel

I find that child support improves a mother’s labor supply and self-sufficiency.
Although I do not have data on how mothers spend child support, the findings of
this study suggest that child support may play a role in reducing barriers to labor
market entrance and increasing weeks worked.
The literature finds that cash assistance usually decreases the labor supply of
recipients. [36] and [53] find that AFDC programs reduce labor supply by 10 to
50%. [37] shows food stamps also decrease the labor supply of single mothers. Even
the earned income tax credit (EITC), which gives higher benefits with employment,
may deter the labor supply of married mothers (Eissa and Hoynes 21). AFDC,
TANF, and food stamps are designed to ensure a basic level of consumption in
low-income families. Consequently, additional income undermines the recipient’s
eligibility for these programs. Child support, a universal cash transfer, does not have
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Table 3.6: DiD: the effect of CS payment on child investment
VARIABLES
β

Observations
R-squared
Controls
FEs

(1)
private insurance

(2)
medicaid

(3)
school lunch subsidy

(4)
school attendance

(5)
highschool

(6)
weeks worked

-0.0792
(0.176)

-0.0560**
(0.0275)

-0.137
(0.0844)

-0.106
(0.134)

0.222
(0.188)

3.462
(3.481)

711
0.339
Y
Y

5,410
0.219
Y
Y

2,989
0.256
Y
Y

707
0.486
Y
Y

969
0.347
Y
Y

2,125
0.347
Y
Y

Note: this table reports difference-in-difference (DiD) estimator β from Equation 3.2. The outcome
variables include multiple measures of child investment as private insurance coverage, Medicaid
coverage, school lunch subsidy, school attendance, high school degree, and weeks worked. Note that
the number of observations in this analysis is very small because most outcome variables are only
recorded in 1992 CPS-CSS. The estimation includes all control variables and fixed effects specified
in Equation 3.2. The standard error is clustered at the state level. ***p<.001, **p<.05,*p<.10,
respectively.
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this disincentive. However, this unconditional cash transfer can reduce the labor
supply if leisure is a normal good.
The literature, however, finds that childcare subsidies and public schooling
programs increase maternal labor supply (Averett et al. 4, Lefebvre and Merrigan
48, Bauernschuster and Schlotter 5, Geyer et al. 27). These programs are designed to
reduce the labor supply constraints – the financial burden of taking care of children.
[43] considers child care costs as a fixed cost for labor supply since the mother’s time
allocation decision involves labor, leisure, and child care. Similarly, [4] views child
care as a cost per hour of labor.
The literature implies that child support may increase the maternal labor supply
if child support covers child care costs. A pattern in the literature is that programs
directly designed to cover childcare expenses positively impact the maternal labor
supply. Although I do not have data to prove whether mothers use child support for
child care, I provide suggestive evidence that STRI reduces the number of mothers
saying they are not working because of taking care of family. I find that the maternal
labor supply increases by 13% when the mother is the sole breadwinner in her
household.17 In contrast, there is no significant increase when the mother co-habits
with an employed adult. This result is not causal analysis since I cannot guarantee
her co-habitation status is determined before STRI. However, it provides suggestive
evidence for future research.

3.7

Conclusion

STRI collects child support arrears by intercepting state tax refunds of the absent
parents. I use staggered timing of STRI implementation and child’s age for the
identification strategy. This study finds that STRI significantly improves the child
support payment in both extensive and intensive margins. As a result, single mothers
are less likely to live in poverty and rely on public support. In addition, STRI
17

The estimation result is Table C.5 in the appendix.
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significantly increases maternal labor supply; mothers are more likely to enter the
labor market; work 6.5 weeks more per year.
This study provides new evidence on child support enforcement and labor supply.
This implies that child support has distinctive characteristics compared to standard
income assistance programs. I suggest the possibility that child support may alleviate
financial constraints on the maternal labor supply.

The previous literature and

theoretical prediction indicate this hypothesis is worth exploring in future work.
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Appendix A
Table A.1: RD: main result with alternative polynomial degrees

Dep. Vars

Drug Offense

Possession Drug

SMD

Drug Offense

Possession Drug

SMD

-0.123**

-0.0908

-0.157**

-0.121*

-0.0708

-0.170*

(0.0521)

(0.0619)

(0.0738)

(0.0618)

(0.0732)

(0.0882)

Panel A. Border Counties
β

Observations

2,929

2,118

1,374

2,929

2,118

1,374

Eff Obs Below Cutoff

581

430

318

637

409

372

Eff Obs Above Cutoff

644

504

353

697

480

429

MSE-optimal Bandwidth

304.9

318.2

350.1

327.2

304

405.9

Degree of Polynomial in

2

2

2

3

3

3

Panel B. Border Counties with 150 BW
β

Observations

-0.0758

-0.0314

-0.140

-0.0196

0.0769

-0.188

(0.0676)

(0.0737)

(0.109)

(0.0807)

(0.0796)

(0.133)

2,929

2,118

1,374

2,929

2,118

1,374

Eff Obs Below Cutoff

277

200

120

277

200

120

Eff Obs Above Cutoff

337

250

166

337

250

166

MSE-optimal Bandwidth

150

150

150

150

150

150

Degree of Polynomial in

2

2

2

3

3

3

Panel C. All Counties
β

Observations

-0.0146

0.0168

-0.0281

-0.0107

0.0247

-0.0347

(0.0157)

(0.0214)

(0.0242)

(0.0209)

(0.0264)

(0.0262)

28,697

19,957

13,627

28,697

19,957

13,627

Eff Obs Below Cutoff

6671

3860

2467

6131

4136

3684

Eff Obs Above Cutoff

6936

4060

2498

6481

4398

3684

MSE-optimal Bandwidth

347.4

284.8

270.4

322.8

306.2

396.3

Degree of Polynomial in

2

2

2

3

3

3

Notes: The tables reports RDD estimates from Equation 1.1 and heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors are estimated in parentheses. Panel A and Panel B use offenders data in the
border counties. Panel A uses MSE-optimal bandwidth, whereas Panel B uses a constant
bandwidth of 150 days before and after the onset of the Holder Memo, Aug. 12, 2013. Panel C
uses offenders data in all counties. First three columns report the estimated coefficients in
Table 1.4 with oloynominal degree two and the last three columns report those of polymonial
degree three. All analysis use triangular kernel (Stata default).
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Table A.2: RD: main result with alternative kernels
Dep. Vars
Panel A. Border Counties
β

Drug Offense

Possession Drug

SMD

Drug Offense

Possession Drug

SMD

-0.125**
(0.0493)

-0.0824
(0.0542)

-0.112*
(0.0590)

-0.114**
(0.0465)

-0.0870*
(0.0476)

-0.120**
(0.0603)

1,374
210
256
239.1

2,929
345
401
182.3

-0.145**
(0.0727)

-0.123**
(0.0498)

1,374
120
166
150

2,929
277
337
150

-0.0101
(0.0199)

-0.0113
(0.0138)

13,627
1457
1420
159.1

28,697
3918
3919
198.8

Observations
2,929
Eff Obs Below Cutoff
269
Eff Obs Above Cutoff
332
MSE-optimal Bandwidth
146.4
Kernel Function
Panel B. Border Counties with 150 BW
β
-0.114**
(0.0486)

2,118
253
300
185.2
Uniform

Observations
Eff Obs Below Cutoff
Eff Obs Above Cutoff
MSE-optimal Bandwidth
Kernel Function
Panel C. All Counties
β

2,118
205
251
150
Uniform

Observations
Eff Obs Below Cutoff
Eff Obs Above Cutoff
MSE-optimal Bandwidth
Kernel Function

2,929
282
338
150

-0.00358
(0.0146)
28,697
3082
3129
159.2

-0.0881
(0.0583)

0.00131
(0.0149)
19,957
3303
3425
240.2
Uniform

2,118
387
447
280.5
Epanechnikov
-0.105*
(0.0605)
2,118
200
250
150
Epanechnikov
0.00787
(0.0161)
19,957
3186
3222
227.4
Epanechnikov

1,374
230
264
256.6

-0.138*
(0.0747)
1,374
120
166
150

-0.0214
(0.0207)
13,627
1501
1463
164.3

Notes: The tables reports RDD estimates from Equation 1.1 and heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors are estimated in parentheses. Panel A and Panel B use offenders data in the
border counties. Panel A uses MSE-optimal bandwidth, whereas Panel B uses a constant
bandwidth of 150 days before and after the onset of the Holder Memo, Aug. 12, 2013. Panel C
uses offenders data in all counties. First three columns report the estimated coefficients in
Table 1.4 using uniform kernel and the last three columns report those of Epanechnikov kernel. All
analysis use polynomial degree one.
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Figure A.1: Smoothness test of the hispanic offenders
Notes: In this figure, the dependent variables is an indicator variables that equals one if the offender
s race is hispanic, and zero otherwise. The estimating equation is identical to Equation 1.1 and the
MSE-optimal bandwidths are selected. Bin sizes are selected by using Mimicking Variable Averagespaced Method (ESMV)
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+h
−
• 1% increase in refugee per capita: Ref
pop+h
• 0.1 % increase in refugee crime per capita:


Ref.Crime+c
− Ref.Crime
= 0.001.
pop+h
pop
• Given the average values of E(Ref )=2106.6,
E(P op)=192,746, E(ref.Crime)=370.5.
• h∗ = 1, 968 c∗ = 198.5

120

Ref
pop

= 0.01.

Table B.1: Event study: refugee and crime
(1)
ASdt − AS dt−1

2011

(2)


ASdt
popdt

−

(3)

AS dt−1
popdt−1



· 1, 000



ref.Crimedt
popdt

−

ref.Crimedt−1
popdt−1

1.778

0.0799**

0.00208

(6.490)

(0.0320)

(0.0126)

2012

12.11

-0.0698

-0.00896

(9.212)

(0.0524)

(0.0146)

2013

29.71**

0.00525

0.0478**

(13.67)

(0.0527)

(0.0195)

2014

87.50***

0.196*

0.0364

(24.04)

(0.110)

(0.0325)

2015

443.9***

1.959***

0.133*

(132.4)

(0.709)

(0.0687)

2016

-367.0***

-2.548***

-0.672

(85.69)

(0.744)

(0.582)

2017

-165.0**

-0.0835

0.166

(67.10)

(0.245)

(0.128)

Observations

2,627

2,627

2,627

R-squared

0.508

0.411

Fixed effect



· 1, 000

0.125
State-by-year

Note: This table shows regression results of Figure 2.2. The estimating equation is Equation 2.1. The dependent
variables
are the difference
in the number of asylum seekers (ASdt − AS
population
h
i
h dt−1 ), asylum seekers per 1,000
i

(

ASdt
popdt

−

AS dt−1
popdt−1

· 1, 000), and refugee crimes per 1,000 population (

121

ref.Crimedt
popdt

−

ref.Crimedt−1
popdt−1

· 1, 000).

Table B.2: Event study: control variables
∆Female AS

∆Adult AS

∆Higher Assit AS

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

∆Pop

∆For.pop

∆Ger. Pop

∆UE

∆GDPcap

∆SGBXII

∆Rep. Crime

167.2

-52.38

219.6*

0.00206***

20.86

-0.000916

(119.6)

(34.66)

(112.6)

(0.000544)

(189.6)

(0.000578)

121.2

-63.39*

184.5*

0.000130

339.3

-0.000884

(93.92)

(37.03)

(102.3)

(0.000594)

(229.4)

(0.000759)

363.8**

114.0

249.8**

-0.000197

-381.5

0.000575

(157.7)

(70.62)

(108.5)

(0.000411)

(404.1)

(0.000954)

∆Clearup

∆For.Suspect

-0.0192

0.00460

-0.0138

-390.2

-337.9

-52.30

9.25e-05

-340.5

-0.000250*

-0.00101

-0.562*

-0.00152

(0.0135)

(0.00636)

(0.0134)

(356.7)

(276.0)

(350.6)

(0.000384)

(250.7)

(0.000140)

(0.000833)

(0.298)

(0.00182)

0.0184

-0.00264

0.00710

388.7**

234.4**

154.3

0.000500

87.07

-3.57e-05

0.000141

0.390

0.00263

(0.0159)

(0.00785)

(0.0209)

(176.1)

(99.88)

(94.87)

(0.000313)

(177.5)

(0.000107)

(0.000460)

(0.262)

(0.00162)

-0.00416

0.000670

-0.00820

359.8**

231.9**

128.0

-0.000338

465.0***

-2.90e-06

0.000899*

0.0324

-0.00159

(0.00720)

(0.00711)

(0.00813)

(165.2)

(108.3)

(89.65)

(0.000303)

(151.2)

(8.16e-05)

(0.000485)

(0.268)

(0.00163)

-0.00820

0.0157**

0.00178

529.1***

414.2***

114.9

1.61e-05

-285.7

-2.34e-05

-0.000366

0.295

-7.07e-05

(0.00653)

(0.00746)

(0.00854)

(177.5)

(129.9)

(80.32)

(0.000275)

(176.7)

(8.31e-05)

(0.000553)

(0.282)

(0.00179)

0.00265

-0.00584

-0.0274*

846.4***

780.5***

65.88

-0.000149

435.4

0.000155*

-0.000328

0.502

-0.000713

(0.00774)

(0.00784)

(0.0153)

(223.3)

(207.8)

(79.59)

(0.000244)

(326.0)

(7.91e-05)

(0.000479)

(0.510)

(0.00167)

0.00274

0.0101*

0.0196

-53.97

-54.08

0.109

-0.000575*

-713.9

-0.000118*

0.000462

-0.643

0.000636

(0.00496)

(0.00545)

(0.0151)

(189.8)

(186.5)

(74.12)

(0.000337)

(813.1)

(6.89e-05)

(0.000590)

(0.479)

(0.00842)

0.00345

-0.00146

-0.00215

263.3**

211.8**

51.54

0.000195

84.64

4.69e-05

0.000583

0.245

0.00256

(0.00404)

(0.00493)

(0.0189)

(123.7)

(98.73)

(69.87)

(0.000284)

(185.2)

(0.000105)

(0.000513)

(0.559)

(0.00284)

Obs

2,771

2,746

2,458

4,020

4,020

4,020

4,007

3,990

2,785

3,986

2,656

2,656

R2

0.135

0.177

0.575

0.401

0.461

0.176

0.735

0.198

0.069

0.086

0.207

0.207

FE

State-by-year

Note: This table shows regression results of Figure 2.3. The estimating equation is Equation 2.1. ∆ indicates a first differenced variable (e.g., Ydt − Ydt−1 ). The
dependent variables are porportion of female asylum seekers among all asylum seekers (Female AS), proportion of asylum seekers receiving further social assistant of
SGB XII after 18 month of residence (Higher Assit AS), population (Pop), foreign population (For.pop), German population (Ger. pop), unemployment rate (UE), GDP
per capita (GDPcap), recipients of social assistance of SGB XII per capita (SGBXII), reported crime rate (Rep. Crime), overall crime clearance rate (Clearup), ratio of
non-refugee foreign suspects (For.suspect).
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Table B.3: 2SLS: refugee arrival and their crime rate
First Stage
ASdt
popdt

\ dt )
IV (IV.AS

AS

− popdt−1
dt−1

Second Stage (2SLS)
ref.Crdt
popdt

−

ref.Crdt−1
popdt−1

OLS
ref.Crdt
popdt

−

ref.Crdt−1
popdt−1

0.533***
(0.113)

ASdt
popdt

−

AS dt−1
popdt−1

Populationdt−1 − Populationdt−2
GDP per capitadt−1 − GDP per capitadt−2
Unemployment ratedt−1 − Unemployment ratedt−2
For. Crime clearancedt−1 − For. Crime clearancedt−2

Observations
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic

0.102**

0.0352***

(0.0491)

(0.00802)

-6.89e-08

-3.26e-08

-3.52e-08

(1.34e-07)

(2.81e-08)

(2.76e-08)

5.30e-07*

-3.56e-08

-4.18e-09

(2.77e-07)

(3.87e-08)

(4.25e-08)
-0.0916

0.0199

-0.0909

(0.111)

(0.106)

(0.108)

-0.0236

0.00228

0.000845

(0.0237)

(0.00613)

(0.00554)

754

754

754

22.37

22.37

Fixed effect

State-by-year

Notes: this table reports the first stage and second stage of 2SLS from the estimating equation, Equation 2.3. The first column shows the first
stage outcomes, the second column shows the 2SLS estimator, and the third column shows the OLS estimator. All variables are first
differenced and I include covariates and state-by-year fixed effect of µs × µt . The standard errors are clustered at the district level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B.4: Alternative 2SLS result
First Stage
ASdt
popdt

Distrct has MFs (=”1” for 2015 and ”-1” for 2016)

AS

− popdt−1
dt−1

Second Stage (2SLS)
ref.Crimedt
popdt

−

ref.Crimedt−1
popdt−1

0.00340***
(0.000680)

ASdt
popdt

−

AS dt−1

0.129*

popdt−1

(0.0782)

Populationdt−1 − Populationdt−2
GDP per capitadt−1 − GDP per capitadt−2
Unemployment ratedt−1 − Unemployment ratedt−2
For. Crime clearancedt−1 − For. Crime clearancedt−2

Observations
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic

-4.10e-08

-3.16e-08

(1.33e-07)

(2.91e-08)

5.43e-07**

-4.82e-08

(2.71e-07)

(4.25e-08)

0.00670

-0.0906

(0.111)

(0.106)

-0.0221

0.00286

(0.0238)

(0.00672)

754

754

25.04

25.04

Notes: this table reports the first stage and second stage of 2SLS with an alternative IV. I simply
multiplies by -1 for MFs districts and 0 for non-MF districts in 2016, while 1 for MF districts and
0 for non-MF districts in 2015. The rest of sepecification is identical to Equation 2.3. The first
column shows the first stage outcomes and the second column shows the 2SLS estimator. All
variables are first differenced and I include covariates and state-by-year fixed effect of µs × µt . The
standard errors are clustered at the district level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B.5: 2SLS: Refugees and crime in different year window
ref.Crimedt
popdt

Year

ASdt
popdt

−

AS dt−1
popdt−1

Observations

−

ref.Crimedt−1
popdt−1

15

16

15-16

14-16

11-16

15-17

14-17

11-17

0.0584***

0.228

0.102**

0.130

0.136

0.0982**

0.116

0.118

(0.0162)

(0.257)

(0.0491)

(0.0841)

(0.0866)

(0.0496)

(0.0833)

(0.0856)

377

377

754

1,131

2,233

1,130

1,507

2,609

R-squared

0.533

0.011

0.130

0.098

0.087

0.130

0.113

0.109

Kleibergen-Paap F statistic

14.26

11.11

22.37

20.02

19.27

22.14

20.77

19.68

Fixed effect

State

State-by-year

Notes: this table reports the second stage of 2SLS from the estimating equation, Equation 2.3. Each column represent different year window.
The first column shows 2SLS estimation only with data of 2015. The last column shows 2SLS result using data from 2011 to 2017. All
variables are first differenced and I include covariates and state-by-year fixed effect of µs × µt . The standard errors are clustered at the district
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B.6: 2SLS: net change in refugee crime
Crimedt − Crimedt−1
popdt−1
VARIABLES

ASdt
popdt

−

AS dt−1
popdt−1

Populationdt−1 − Populationdt−2
GDP per capitadt−1 − GDP per capitadt−2
Unemployment ratedt−1 − Unemployment ratedt−2
For. Crime clearancedt−1 − For. Crime clearancedt−2

Observations
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic

Reported Crime

Refugee Suspect

German Suspect

Non-refugee Foreign Suspect

-0.0885

0.104**

-0.0511*

-0.0572

(0.104)

(0.0495)

(0.0305)

(0.0507)

4.02e-08

-3.19e-08

-3.33e-08*

6.56e-08**

(1.04e-07)

(2.83e-08)

(1.85e-08)

(2.68e-08)

2.73e-07**

-3.51e-08

5.90e-08*

2.65e-08

(1.25e-07)

(3.91e-08)

(3.22e-08)

(3.80e-08)

0.104

-0.0897

0.0111

0.105

(0.0989)

(0.106)

(0.0224)

(0.109)

-0.00686

0.00271

-0.00274

-0.00244

(0.0104)

(0.00618)

(0.00283)

(0.00570)

754

754

754

754

22.37

22.37

22.37

22.37

Fixed effect

State-by-year

Note: this table reports the 2SLS estimation from the equation, Equation 2.3. The dependent variables are net changes in total crime rate and
the number of suspects per capita. Crimedt is the number of crime committed by natives or foreigners and popdt−1 is the district population
in the previous year. This transformation prevents a decrease in native and foreign crime rates simply because of the increase in population.
The lagged population of popdt−1 does not include the newly-arrived refugees in the current year. The suspect are categorized by immigrant
status. Non-refugee foreign suspects refers to foreign suspects who are not asylum seekers. The equation includes covariates and state-by-year
fixed effect. The standard errors are clustered at the district level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B.7: 2SLS: the effect of refugee arrival on the crime rate in neighboring
districts
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Change in the average crime rate in three districts near to the district d
Reported Crime

Refugee

German

Non-refugee Foreign

-0.129*

0.0186

-0.0367

-0.00345

(0.0781)

(0.0315)

(0.0254)

(0.0292)

731

731

731

731

R-squared

0.232

0.309

0.625

0.124

Kleibergen-Paap F statistic

22.30

22.30

22.30

22.30

ASdt
popdt

−

AS dt−1
popdt−1

Observations

Notes: Note: this table reports the 2SLS estimation from the equation, Equation 2.3. The
dependent variable is the average crime rates of the three nearest neighboring districts to district
d. The equation includes a state-by-year fixed effect. The standard errors are clustered at the
district level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table B.8: 2SLS: the effect of refugee arrival on the crime rate in neighboring
districts
(1)

(2)

(3)

Change in the average crime rate in three districts near to the district d
VARIABLES

ASdt
popdt

−

AS dt−1
popdt−1

Observations

Refugee

German

Non-refugee Foreign

0.0186

-0.0367

-0.00345

(0.0315)

(0.0254)

(0.0292)

731

731

731

R-squared

0.309

0.625

0.124

Kleibergen-Paap F statistic

22.30

22.30

22.30

Notes: Note: this table reports the 2SLS estimation from the equation, Equation 2.3. The
dependent variable is the average crime rates of the three nearest neighboring districts to district
d. The equation includes a state-by-year fixed effect. The standard errors are clustered at the
district level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure B.1: Permits for the construction of new residential buildings
Notes: The estimating equation is identical with Equation 2.1. The dependent variable is the number
of building permits based the size of dwelling per capita.
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C

Appendix C
Table C.1: Legislation year of child support enforcement part 1
State

State tax refund intercept

Genetic tests

Paternity until 18

Numerical guideline

Presumptive guideline

AL

1985

1984

1984

1987

1989

1989

1976

1987

1987

AK
AZ

1985

1984

1971

1989

1989

AR

1983

1989

1985

1989

1989

CA

1984

1990

CO
CT

1991

1986

1986

1990

1991

1985

1986

1986

1989

1985

1989

1989

DE

1992

1984

1984

1983

1988

DC

1987

1984

1984

1990

1990

FL
GA

1986

1986

1987

1989

1980

1991

1980

1989

1989

HI

1982

1989

1983

1986

1986

ID

1981

1982

1985

1989

1989

IL

1989

1984

1984

1984

1990

IN

1981

1987

1986

1989

1989

IA

1980

1989

1990

1984

1989

KS

1981

1994

1985

1986

1992

KY

1986

1984

1986

1990

1990

LA

1992

1985

1980

1989

1989

ME

1985

1991

1985

1989

1989

MD

1957

1984

1984

1989

1989

MA

1986

1986

1986

1989

1989

MI

1985

1982

1986

1985

1990

MN

1980

1980

1980

1983

1983

MS

1985

1987

1981

1989

1989

MO

1984

1987

1987

1989

1989

MT

1985

1989

1985

1989

1989

Note: this table shows the legislation years of child support enforcement for each state. The blank cells indicate the state has not
implemented the policy by 1998. [38] collects this information from the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL-SLS) and
Office of Child Support Enforcement Legislative Tracking System Report (OCSE-LTSR). Column (1) state tax refund intercept means
child support agencies can intercept child support arrears from the absent parent’s state income tax refund. Column (2) genetic test
indicates the year of state adopts genetic test results as evidence to prove the paternity of a child in the state courts. Column (3)
paternity until 18 means the never-married parents can establish paternity any time until the child emancipates to 18. Column (4)
numerical guideline means the state provides nonbinding guidelines to advise judges when enforcing child support laws. Column (5)
Presumptive guidelines require judges to follow child support guidelines unless they can provide “good reason” to deviate.
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Table C.2: Legislation year of child support enforcement part 2
State

State tax refund intercept

Genetic tests

Paternity until 18

Numerical guideline

NE

1984

1984

1986

1985

1985

1989

1983

1987

1989

NV
NH

Presumptive guideline

1988

1985

1988

1988

NJ

1985

1983

1983

1986

1988

NM

1985

1986

1986

1988

1989

NY

1985

1976

1985

1989

1989

NC

1979

1979

1981

1985

1989

ND

1983

1989

1975

1983

1989

OH

1985

1986

1982

1990

1990

OK

1985

1985

1985

1988

1989

OR

1985

1981

1983

1989

1989

PA

1985

1989

1985

1985

1989

RI

1982

1984

1988

1987

1987

SC

1984

1984

1984

1989

1989

SD

1989

1986

1989

1989

TN

1983

1984

1989

1989

TX

1989

1983

1989

1989

UT

1985

1992

1990

1989

1989

VT

1989

1983

1983

1985

1985

VA

1950

1985

1988

1988

1988

1994

1976

1988

1988

WV

WA
1995

1989

1986

1986

1989

WI

1987

1987

1983

1983

1987

1989

1978

1989

1989

WY

Note: this table shows the legislation years of child support enforcement for each state. The blank cells indicate the state has not
implemented the policy by 1998. [38] collects this information from the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL-SLS) and
Office of Child Support Enforcement Legislative Tracking System Report (OCSE-LTSR). Column (1) state tax refund intercept means
child support agencies can intercept child support arrears from the absent parent’s state income tax refund. Column (2) genetic test
indicates the year of state adopts genetic test results as evidence to prove the paternity of a child in the state courts. Column (3)
paternity until 18 means the never-married parents can establish paternity any time until the child emancipates to 18. Column (4)
numerical guideline means the state provides nonbinding guidelines to advise judges when enforcing child support laws. Column (5)
Presumptive guidelines require judges to follow child support guidelines unless they can provide “good reason” to deviate.
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Table C.3: Legislation year of child support enforcement part 3
State

Wage withholding

Immediate withholding

Universal withholding

Voluntary Paternity Acknowledgment

AL

1984

1989

1993

1994

AK

1981

1988

1994

1997

AZ

1977

1987

1987

1996

AR

1983

1989

1991

1994

CA

1980

1989

1989

1995

CO

1981

1989

1993

1996

CT

1955

1983

1983

1994

DE

1974

1990

1994

1995

DC

1987

1990

1995

1998

FL

1978

1986

1986

1997

GA

1981

1989

1993

1999

HI

1984

1988

1988

1999

ID

1986

1990

1993

1998

IL

1984

1988

1988

1997

IN

1982

1985

1997

1997

IA

1984

1990

1993

KS

1985

1990

1992

KY

1984

1988

1988

1997
1996

LA

1982

1989

1993

1998

ME

1985

1990

1991

1996

MD

1976

1991

1993

1997

MA

1986

1986

1998

1994

MI

1982

1990

1990

1993

MN

1978

1990

1993

1995

MS

1985

1989

1993

1995

MO

1973

1990

1993

1994

MT

1985

1989

1991

NE

1985

1991

1994

1995

NV

1985

1989

1993

1995

NH

1985

1993

1993

NJ

1981

1990

1990

NM

1985

1990

1993

1996

NY

1977

1990

1994

1995

NC

1975

1989

1993

1997

ND

1979

1989

1989

1996

OH

1986

1993

1993

1999

OK

1978

1989

1994

OR

1985

1993

1993

1995

PA

1985

1989

1989

1998

RI

1980

1990

1994

1995

SC

1985

1989

1994

1994

SD

1986

1990

1990

1994

TN

1985

1990

1994

1994

TX

1985

1985

UT

1977

1990

1993

VT

1983

1989

1989

1997

VA

1982

1988

1995

1995

WA

1984

1989

1994

1989

WV

1986

1990

1993

1999

WI

1977

1985

1989

WY

1986

1989

1994

1995

1999

Note: this table shows the legislation years of child support enforcement for each state. The blank cells indicate the state has not
implemented the policy by 1998. [38] collects this information from the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL-SLS) and
Office of Child Support Enforcement Legislative Tracking System Report (OCSE-LTSR). Column (1) wage withholding allows states
to garnish the wage of the absent parents to offset child support arrears. Column (2) immediate withholding refers to automatic
withholding of child support for AFDC families and non-AFDC families who applied for the state’s child support services. Column (3)
universal withholding allows automatic wage withholding for all child support cases irrespective of welfare status. Column (4) voluntary
paternity acknowledgment enables fathers to establish legal paternity by signing a paternity form at the hospital when the child is born
or State Office of Vital Records.
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Table C.4: DiD: main results without states without income tax.
(1)
VARIABLES

(2)

received CS

amount of CS

(3)

(4)

poverty

AFDC

(5)

(6)

worked

weeks worked

(7)
not working because of
taking care of family

β

0.104***

417.0**

-0.0972***

-0.0682**

0.122***

6.562***

-0.144*

(0.0232)

(190.4)

(0.0334)

(0.0275)

(0.0307)

(1.640)

(0.0821)

Observations

4,261

4,261

4,261

4,261

4,261

4,261

1,040

R-squared

0.175

0.112

0.235

0.241

0.163

0.188

0.285

Controls

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

FEs

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Note: this table reports difference-in-difference (DiD) estimator β from Equation 3.2. The outcome
variables include multiple measures related child support recipiency, maternal labor supply, and
welfare program participation. This analysis does not include states that did not have a state
income tax by 1998. These non-tax states include Alaska, Connecticut, Nevada, New Hampshire,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Wyoming. The estimation includes all control variables and
fixed effects specified in Equation 3.2. The standard error is clustered at the state level. ***p<.001,
**p<.05,*p<.10, respectively.

Table C.5: DiD: the effect of STRI on labor supply (mother as co-breadwinner or
sole breadwinner in her household)
(1)

(2)

employed last year
co-bread winner

sole-bread winner

0.0914

0.133***

(0.0801)

(0.0325)

Observations

1,126

4,284

R-squared

0.260

0.169

Controls

Y

Y

FEs

Y

Y

β

Note: this table reports difference-in-difference (DiD) estimator β from Equation 3.2. The outcome
variable is the employment status of mothers, which is equal to one if the mother worked last year,
zero otherwise. The result in column (1) shows DiD estimator among female-headed households with
other adults who have a job, namely co-breadwinning mothers. Column (2) shows DiD estimation
among female-headed households without any adult who has a job, namely sole-breadwinning
mothers. The estimation includes all control variables and fixed effects specified in Equation 3.2.
The standard error is clustered at the state level. ***p<.001, **p<.05,*p<.10, respectively.
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Table C.6: DiD: the effect of STRI on the likelihood mother living with an adult
with a job.

living with an adult with a job

β

-0.0507
(0.0303)

Observations

5,410

R-squared

0.092

Controls

Y

FEs

Y

Note: this table reports difference-in-difference (DiD) estimator β from Equation 3.2. The outcome
variable is the likelihood of mothers living with another adult who has a job. The estimation includes
all control variables and fixed effects specified in Equation 3.2. The standard error is clustered at
the state level. ***p<.001, **p<.05,*p<.10, respectively.

Figure C.1: Mother received any child support last year (baseline year k = −1)
Note: this figure plots θk s and 95 percent confidence intervals from the Equation 3.1. The outcome
variable is the likelihood of mothers receiving child support. The baseline θ−1 estimates the difference
in outcome variables between control and treatment groups. The rest of θk estimates the same
difference relative to the baseline θ−1 .
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Figure C.2: Robustness check: mother received any child support last year
Note: this figures show coefficients of θs from Equation 3.1 with the hypothetical STRI year. The
new STRI is 5 years earlier than the original STRI year (k=-5) and the other new STRI year is
set 10 years earlier than the original STRI year (k=-10). The baseline θ0 estimates the difference
in outcome variables between control and treatment groups. The rest of θk estimates the same
difference relative to the baseline θ0 . The hypothetical years of STRI do not have a parallel trend in
the pre-intervention period when k=-5. This is because some households in the new pre-invention
group are actually post-invention groups with the original STRI year. The last column in the figure
shows an event study when the hypothetical STRI is 10 years earlier than the actual STRI year. In
this case, there is no difference in the child support receipt rate between pre-and post-intervention
groups. This is because now all households in the pre-intervention groups actually belong to the
post-intervention group with the original STRI year.
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